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INTRODUCTION

The American Progressive Era to the New Deal, roughly 1900
into the early 1930s, was the formative age of antitrust policy.1 During
this period antitrust developed nearly all of the analytic tools that it
uses today to evaluate business practices or market structures thought
to be anticompetitive. In fact, a good case can be made that after

*

James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Carey Law
School and the Wharton School.
1
Politically, the Progressive Era ended with the election of Warren Harding
in 1920. As an intellectual and economic movement, it survived and
morphed into the New Deal. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF
REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955); MORTON KELLER, REGULATING
A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA,
1900-1933 (1996)
1
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decades of experimentation we are returning to it.2 The extraordinary
Progressive influence on antitrust policy was at least partly a historical
coincidence. The passage of the Sherman and Clayton Acts and the
development of techniques for evaluating practices coincided with the
development of marginalism and the rise of industrial organization in
economics. Antitrust policy would have looked very different had it
developed a half century earlier.
The antitrust movement was both political and economic. It
reflected both the emergence of new interest groups and new sources
of economic concern. The emergent interest groups were large
interstate business, consumers, and labor. The new sources of concern
were industrialization, the rise of modern distribution, the labor
movement, and the increasing importance of the consumer as market
participants. The legislative debate leading up to the Sherman Act can
hardly be characterized as a dispute about economic theory. That came
later as litigants and courts looked for tools that would enable them to
assess practices in a coherent way.
Nevertheless, consistent with the economic-focused language
of the Sherman Act itself, the tools that emerged were almost entirely
economic. While they were largely applied by noneconomist judges,
the record of economic tools that the Progressive period of antitrust
enforcement generated is impressive. Judges routinely used them even
if they were not aware of their economic origins or technical meaning.
Nearly all of these developments placed antitrust theory on an
expansion course that prevailed until the reaction against the New Deal
found a voice in the neoliberalism of the 1940s and after, particularly
as expressed by the Chicago School. Even so, the neoliberal revolution
adopted most of these tools, although it substantially modified some
of them and rejected a few.
The Progressives are sometimes caricatured as people who really
did not care about costs and productivity but were concerned
exclusively about bigness as such. This could not be further from the
truth. By and large the Progressives appreciated the fact that the trusts
had lower costs than smaller firms and did not want to punish them for
that. That was clear already in 1900, as expressed in the various

2

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
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opinions expressed at the Chicago Conference on Trusts.3 They were
worried that the trusts threatened high prices, and that exclusionary
practices might be a vehicle for achieving that. Further, there is no
inconsistency between lower costs and higher prices. The first resulted
from technical progress and scale economies; the second from a
reduction in market competition.
THE CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS

The Progressive Era was heavily preoccupied with the rise of
larger firms, or the “trust” problem. The initial reaction was an eclectic
range of views about what to do about them, or whether to do anything
at all. The enormous 1899 Chicago Conference on Trusts, which was
hosted by the Civic Federation of Chicago, reflected this diversity of
views. Its personnel and proceedings, which were published in 1900,
are so valuable because they included nearly every interest group that
had something to say about the trusts. The speakers included
politicians, economists, lawyers, social scientists and statisticians,
labor union leaders, and insurance company representatives.4 This
diverse group identified a number of phenomena that explained the rise
of the trusts and that either justified them or damned them. Some
argued that the trusts were entirely the consequence of economies of
scale or scope and as such were an engine of economic progress, so
they should be left alone.5 Others argued that potential competition and
new entry would always be present to discipline monopoly pricing,
thus mitigating the concern.6 Many others saw the trusts as harmful
and blamed their rise on deficiencies in state corporate law. They
debated about a national incorporation act as a good potential

3

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS: SPEECHES, DEBATES RESOLUTIONS,
LIST OF THE DELEGATES, COMMITTEES, ETC., SEP. 13-16, 1899 (Civic Fed.
Of Chicago 1900). Pp. iii-vii gives a list of participants and the title of their
contributions.
5
E.g., Charles Foster, former governor of Ohio, id. at 268-271. See also
MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN
CAPITALISM: 1890-1916, at 203-28 (1988) (describing the conference).
4

6

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
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solution.7 Others both blamed and defended tariffs8 or immoral
business actors.9
Within this amalgamation of concerns the Sherman Act was
hardly dominant. In fact, it played a surprisingly small part, and the
speeches tended to emphasize its deficiencies more than its strengths.
Henry Rand Hatfield’s well known account of the Chicago Trust
Conference is very likely responsible for the view that the economists
who spoke were nearly all opposed to the Sherman Act.10 A fair
reading of the entire proceeding suggests two different splits. First was
the division of those who thought that the trusts were efficient and
harmless from those who regarded them as threatening. Contrary to
Hatfield’s view, a clear majority believed that they presented a serious
7

A.E. Rogers, University of Maine, CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supra note __
at 409-421. William Jennings Bryan, id. at 503-509. See also William
Dudley Foulke, id. at 579-580 (opposing Bryans’ suggestion that
corporations be generally forbidden from doing business in more than one
state).
8
E.g, William Jennings Bryan, CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supra note __ at 501
(trusts the product of high tariffs) Bryron W. Holt, New England Free Trade
League, “Tariff the Mother of Trusts,” id. at 171-176; Samuel Adams
Robinson, American Protective Tariff League, id. at 193-201; Lawson Purdy,
id. at 166-171 (arguing that tariffs were a principal vehicle for the rise of the
trusts; “the combinations not protected by an iniquitous tariff are few in
number”). Contrast Henry W. Blair, former United States Senator, “The
Tariff Not Mother of Trust, but Mother of American Wealth and Power,” id.
at 604-619; accord John F. Scanlan, Western Indus. League, id. at 177-186;
Thomas Updegraff, ex-Congressman 187-188 (“Protectionists would kill the
snakes and save the paradise. Free traders in America would devastate the
paradise and save the snakes.”).
9
E.g., William Fortune, id. at 53-57; G.W. Northrup, Jr., id. at 522-530; J. G.
Schonfarber (Knights of Labor), id. at 343-345.
10
See Henry Rand Hatfield, The Chicago Trust Conference, 8 J. POL. ECON.
1, 6 (1899):
The weight of evidence … supported the view that the modern
system of large business establishments was the outgrowth of natural
industrial evolution. This was necessarily the view of those who
advocated trust methods, but it was also advanced by all save one of
the professional economists, by the leading labor representatives,
and even by some who were avowed anti-trust men.
At the time, Hatfield was an economics instructor at the University of
Chicago.
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problem. Second was the question of the best legal tools for
confronting them. Here, Hatfield’s point has somewhat more traction.
As correctives, corporate law and tariff reform were at least as
prominent as the Sherman Act, and many of the speakers professed
strong disappointment in Sherman Act litigation to that time.
By the time of the conference the Sherman Act was nearly ten
years old and had produced two important Supreme Court decisions
condemning railroad cartels.11 Even here, the very small number of
comments on the railroad cartel decisions were more negative than
positive. One complaint was that the railroad cartel cases did not
authorize the courts to set reasonable rates, but only to condemn bad
agreements.12 Another was that the Trans-Missouri case had largely
“expunged” the rule of reason from the law.13
By 1900 the Sherman Act had also been used aggressively
several times against labor unions, a development that was both
praised and condemned by participants. In nearly all of these cases the
plaintiff had been the United States, thus inviting debate about what
should be government policy toward union activities.14 Others
criticized the Supreme Court’s very first antitrust decision, United
States v. E.C. Knight,15 which had concluded that Congress lacked the
Constitutional authority to control intrastate manufacturing simply
because the goods were destined for interstate shipment. That
11

United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n., 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
12
CHICAGO CONFERENCE, supra note __ at 75 (comments of R.S. Taylor);
Id. at 127-133 (comments of F.B. Thurber).
13
Id. at 135 (F.B. Thurber).
14
See United States v. Cassidy, 67 F. 698 (N.D.Cal. 1895) (instructing jury
that Sherman Act reaches labor conspiracy); United States v. Elliott, 62 F.
801 (E.D. Mo. 1894) (granting preliminary injunction under the Sherman
Act, under what is now 15 U.S.C. §25); United States v. Agler, 62 F. 824 (D.
In. 1894) (similar, approving injunction even against defendants who were
not named in the bill). See also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (upholding
labor conspiracy injunction against Eugene Debs under Congressional power
to regulate commerce; not relying on Sherman Act, but noting that the district
court did and expressing no opinion about whether that was correct). Other
decisions are discussed in Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in
American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919, 950 (1988).
15
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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provoked the view that the country “must have a constitution change
if the general government is to deal with the trust problem.”16 Another
speaker praised the railroad cartel decisions as well as E.C. Knight for
developing the distinction between intrastate and interstate trusts.17
The path of antitrust development that took place in subsequent
years was much more focused than the Conference debates, mainly
because most of the alternatives dropped away. The move for a
national incorporation statute ran out of gas.18 Debates over the tariff
remained, but no serious legislation ever linked them to trusts as such.
The role of labor became more prominent and was reflected in
Congressional legislation in §6 of the Clayton Act in 1914, which
became part of the antitrust laws.19 Debates over good morals in
business behavior are of course never ending, but the concerns were
never reflected in the text of an antitrust statute. Rather, when it passed
the Clayton Act in 1914, Congress doubled down on the use of
exclusively economic language. The Act condemned conduct when it
threatened to “substantially lessen competition” or “tend to create a
monopoly.”20

16

Statement by John I. Yellott, Maryland lawyer, CHICAGO CONFERENCE,
supra note __ at 434. He concluded that “this enabling amendment must be
made, or we must rely upon state legislation for a remedy.” Id. at 434-435.
Largely in accord was William Dudley Foulke, id. at 579-580.
17
Id. at 523-524.
18
On the rise and fall of the movement, see GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH
OF CONSERVATISM (1963); Camden Hutchison, Progressive Era
Conceptions of the Corporation and the Failure of the Federal Chartering
Movement, 2018 COL. BUS. L. REV. 1017; Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Corporate
Privileges for the Public Benefit: The Progressive Federal Incorporation
Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 VA. L. REV. 603 (1991);
Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive
Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160, 180 (1982).
19
15 U.S.C. §17.
20
15 U.S.C. §§13 (predatory price discrimination); 14 (tying and exclusive
dealing), 18 (horizontal mergers). 15 U.S.C. §13 was subsequently amended
so as to cover a supplier’s discrimination between its dealers; and 15 U.S.C.
§18 was subsequently amended to reach both vertical mergers and asset
acquisitions, but it continued to use the “substantially lessen competition…”
language).
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One thing that emerges powerfully in the proceedings of the
Conference is that, even though the participants represented a wide
variety of political beliefs as well as professions, the dominant concern
was with the power of the trusts to set high prices. There were a few
exceptions. For example, Progressive economist Henry Carter Adams,
at this time a statistician for the Interstate Commerce Commission,
complained about the “general social and political results of trust
organizations” that must also be considered in addition to their
tendency to reduce costs. “For the preservation of democracy there
must be maintained a fair degree of equality in the social standing of
citizens,” he observed, and wondered whether the rise of the trusts was
consistent with that.21 He concluded:
I would not claim, without discussion, that the trust
organization of society destroys reasonable equality, closes the
door of industrial opportunity, or tends to disarrange that fine
balance essential to the successful workings of an automatic
society; -but I do assert that the questions here presented are
debatable questions, and that the burden of proof lies with the
advocates of this new form of business organization.22
He also suggested that the trusts might have outsize political
influence.23 Dudley Wooten, identified only as a member of the Texas
legislature, agreed, arguing that the trusts were antidemocratic
perversions brought about by selfishness.24 Aaron Jones, a leader of
the national Grange, a populist political organization of farmers,25
observed that the sugar trust made political contributions to the
Republican Party in Republican controlled states and to the Democrats
in Democrat controlled states.26 John W. Hayes, General Secretary of
the Knights of Labor, saw a political war between the power of the
21

CHICAGO CONFERENCE, statement of Henry Carter Adams, supra note __
at 38.
22
Ibid.
23
Id. at 39.
24
Id. at 42 (statement of Dudley G. Wooten, a Texas lawyer and judge).
25
See ROBERT CARROLL MCMATH, JR., AMERICAN POPULISM: A SOCIAL
HISTORY, 1877-1898 at 50-142 (1991) (on the Grange, or National Grange
Patrons of Husbandry, and other agricultural populist groups).
26
Statement of Aaron Jones, Grand Master, National Grange Patrons of
Husbandry, id. at 221.
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state and the power of the trusts,27 as did Edward W. Bemis from the
Bureau of Economic Research.28 William Dudley Foulke, a prominent
journalist and literary critic, argued that “the political and social effects
of monopoly are far more menacing to society than its economic
results.”29 For more conservative political activist George Gunton, by
contrast, politics were present but pulling the other way: politicians
were being urged to abandon sound economic principles of “industrial
freedom” in order to vote the “arbitrary parternalism” of harsh
regulation of the trusts.30
Following the Chicago Conference, Progressives began to
focus more narrowly on the antitrust laws and the discipline of
economics as the proper tool for dealing with the trusts. While political
rhetoric about the trusts has always been present, there is little
evidence that it provided a substantial guide to policy making. The
dominant tool became marginalist economics, then in its infancy, and
the darling of the younger generation of political economists in the
United States. Most of them were Progessives with a much stronger
bias in favor of government intervention than their predecessors had
supported.31
The principal economic tools that emerged were (1) partial
equilibrium analysis, which became the basis for concerns about
economic concentration, the distinction between short- and long-run
analysis, and later came to justify and provide support for the concept
of antitrust’s “relevant market”; (2) classification of costs into fixed
and variable, with the emergent belief that industries with high fixed
costs were more problematic; (3) development of the concept of entry
barriers, contrary to a long classical tradition of assuming that entry is
easy and quick; (4) the distinction between horizontal and vertical
relationships and the emergence of vertical integration as a
competition problem; (5) price discrimination as a practice that could
have competitive consequences. Finally, toward the end of this period
came (6) theories of imperfect competition, including the rediscovery
27

John W. Hayes, id. at 331, 334.
Id. at 394, 397-398.
29
Comments of William Dudley Foulke, id. at 454.
30
George Gunton, Comments, supra note __ at 276.
31
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement,
42 STAN. L. REV. 993 (1990).
28
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of oligopoly theory and the rise of product differentiation as relevant
to antitrust policy making.
MARGINALIST ECONOMICS AND MARKET REVISIONISM

The antitrust movement in the United States coincided with a farreaching revolution in economics, such as economic thought has not
seen before or since. The marginalist revolution has unfortunately been
seriously undervalued in history writing about antitrust, mainly
because so many historians who are not economists did not understand
it and failed to appreciate its implications.32 Nevertheless, the fact
remains that one cannot understand the set of tools that antitrust policy
makers deployed without understanding their underlying economics.
By 1930 virtually every economist was a marginalist.33
Briefly, the classical political economists saw value as inhering in
goods or the labor that went into making them.34 They tended to assess
costs and benefits by looking at averages, which were necessarily
taken from the past. They also tended to believe that capital would flow
32

E.g., HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION
OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1954) (no references to marginalism);
WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE
EVOLUTIONOF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT (1954) (same). Some later
histories contain brief discussions. See, e.g, RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ,
COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 94-96 (1996)
(describing marginalist revolution)
33
See Frank Knight, “Marginal Utility Economics” 148-149, in FRANK H.
KNIGHT, THE ETHICS OF COMPETITION (1935), reprinted from THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Edwin R. A.Seligman, ed.,
1930).
34
On marginalism and the reaction to classical political economy, see MARK
BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 277-310 (5th ed. 1997);
RICHARD S. HOWEY, THE RISE OF THE MARGINAL UTILITY SCHOOL, 18701889 (1960); YUVAL P. YONAY, THE STRUGGLE OVER THE SOUL OF
ECONOMICS: INSTITUTIONALIST AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMISTS IN
AMERICA BETWEEN THE WARS 29-48 (1998). In American Law, see Herbert,
Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 Vand. L. Rev.
305 (1993).
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naturally toward profit, and that the only practical impediment was
government licenses or other restrictions.35 In sharp contrast,
marginalists saw value as willingness to pay or accept for the next, or
“marginal,” unit of something. As a result, its perspective on value was
much more forward looking.
Two features of marginalism account for both its influence and the
resistance to it. One was that it both required and enabled expansive
use of mathematics unlike anything known to the classical economists.
Another was that marginalist analysis enabled various values
governing demand, supply, or economic movement to be “metered,”
or quantified, in ways that classical political economy could not do.
This feature also made marginalist economics much more technical,
with increasing informational demands, but also promised to give
marginalist economics capabilities far beyond those of its
predecessors.
Markets as Human Institutions: Coercion

The classical economists saw the world of commercial
relationships in binary terms. For private arrangements people were
either free or bound. Aside from government constraint, the boundaries
of obligation were defined by contract, property, and tort law. Value
inhered in things or the labor used to produce them, and people either
purchased or not. Setting side public obligations, within that world
people were free to make their own economic decisions unless a
contract, property right, or sovereign command bound them. That bond
was particularly strong because the common law principle of liberty of
contract refused to set very many contracts aside.36 Further, the
classical tradition regarded the market itself as a part of nature. Francis
Wayland’s very popular textbook on political economy defined the
discipline in 1886 as “a branch of true science,” and by science “we

35

See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial
organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 149-150 (1989).
36
See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
(1985).
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mean a systematic arrangement of the laws which God has
established….”37
By contrast, one prominent feature of the late nineteenth century
was its fascination with change – in everything from biological
evolution to physics to mechanics. The historian Howard Mumford
Jones described the period as the “Age of Energy.”38 It was only
natural that economists would develop marginalism, with its forwardlooking concept of value that focused on the next thing rather than on
averages from the past.39 “Equilibrium” became the steady state to
which all change aspired but seldom reached.
Marginalism began with the premise that value is a measurable
expression of human choice. Value depended on willingness to pay or
willingness to forego. Further, marginalism distinguished among
goods depending on costs, availability, and preference. One corollary
was the increasing belief that markets were not all the same and did
not all function equally well. This opened the way for more substantial
if selective intervention to correct market deficiencies.40
Under the marginalist conception, markets were human
creations and not merely a reflection of permanent laws of nature.
Their design was a product not only of preference but also of state
policy, which could be for good or for ill. As the institutionalist
progressive economist John R. Commons put it in his important book
on the legal foundations of capitalism:
Economic phenomena, as we know them, are the result of
artificial selection and not of natural selection. Their evolution
is like that of a steam engine or a breed of cattle, rather than
like that of a continent, monkey or tiger….

37

FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 4 (rev. ed.,
Aaron L Chapin, ed., 1886).
38
HOWARD MUMFORD JONES, THE AGE OF ENERGY: VARIETIES OF
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, 1865-1915 (1970).
39
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW:
NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870-1980 at 4-52, 75-158 (2015).
40
On marginalism and the development of American regulatory policy, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation and the Marginalist Revolution, 71 FL. L.
REV. 455 (2019).
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Thus it is, also, with all of the phenomena of political
economy. They are the present outcome of rights of property
and powers of government which have been fashioned and
refashioned in the past by courts, legislatures and executives
through control of human behavior by means of working rules,
directed towards purposes deemed useful or just by the
lawgivers and law interpreters.41
An outpouring of literature stretching from the 1890s through
the early decades of the twentieth century developed aspects of this
view that markets are “created” rather than simply present in the
natural world. One manifestation was unprecedented economic
concern with the distribution of wealth and the idea that this was a
legitimate target of state policy because the state was responsible for it
in the first place.42 Another was the concern, best expressed by
Progressive economist Richard T. Ely, that the legal system itself was
strongly biased against the poor. In his important book on the common
law and the distribution of wealth, Ely concluded that the coercive
rules of property and contract tended to cede power to those who
already had it.43 In a review, Cambridge economist Charles Percy
Sanger concluded that “the most salient fact is the mass of evidence

41

JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 376-377
(1924).
42
Published books alone include JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF
WEALTH: A THEORY OF WAGES, INTEREST AND PROFITS (1899); THOMAS
NIXON CARVER, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1904); JOHN R.
COMMONS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1893); RUFUS COPE, THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1890); CHARLES W. MACFARLANE, VALUE
AND DISTRIBUTION (1899); JOHN K. RYAN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1916);
CHARLES B. SPAHR, AN ESSAY ON THE PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
IN THE UNITED STATES (1896); DAVID A. WELLS, RECENT ECONOMIC
CHANGES, AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF
WEALTH AND THE WELL-BEING OF SOCIETY (1889).
43
RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (2 vols., 1914).
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which shows how hostile the constitution of the United States, as
interpreted by judges is to the poor or the public.”44
Another consequence, which had more relevance for antitrust
policy, was the idea that markets themselves could be coercive
instruments that limited human freedom. Columbia professor Robert
Hale, another Progressive who was one of the earliest economists to
be hired onto a law school faculty, expressed this idea for an entire
generation. In an article entitled “Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State” he observed that the economic
systems that had been developed by classical economists gave lip
service to freedom. In reality, however, their systems are “permeated
with coercive restrictions of individual freedom, and with restrictions,
moreover, out of conformity with any formula of “equal opportunity”
or “preserving the equal rights of others.”45
Many of these newly discovered concerns about market
coercion showed up in public law – things such as greater protection
for labor from onerous wage agreements, prohibitions of child labor,
the progressive income tax, and eventually the expansive safety net
programs of the New Deal. But they also affected competition policy.
As noted later, for example, the law of vertical restraints became
increasingly aggressive It abandoned very benign common law rules
for virtual per se illegality for most distribution agreements that limited
dealer behavior, as well as aggressive rules for vertical mergers.46 The
classical conception that new entry would always be around to
discipline monopoly unless the government prevented it gave way to
one that saw markets themselves as forestalling new competition.47
The idea of competition itself came increasingly under attack, and not
from socialists who did not believe in it. Rather it was from
neoclassically-trained economists who realized that the viability of
44

Charles Percy Sanger, Book Review, 25 ECON. J. 424 (1915). Sanger was a
student of Alfred Marshall and focused on mathematical economics until he
drifted into law.
45
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923). On Hale, see BARBARA H. FRIED,
THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE
FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (2001).
46
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
47
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
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competitive markets depended on several assumptions that did not
invariably obtain.48
Partial Equilibrium Analysis

Marginal utility theory permitted the creation of tools for
determining the relationship between costs and either competitive or
monopoly prices within a firm. By itself, however, it was not able to
assess how competition works among multiple firms of what are the
conditions for achieving it. That required additional theory about
interactions among firms.
Partial equilibrium analysis permitted people to group
individual industries into markets, on the assumption that the
interactions of firms within the same market were much more
important for evaluating competition than the interactions (or lack of
them) among firms in different markets. Further, as soon as one
relaxed the assumption that resources would move freely and quickly
from any place of low utility to any place of higher utility it became
prudent to investigate where such movements could be expected to
occur and where they would be less likely. Cambridge University
Professor Alfred Marshall, the first great marginalist industrial
economist, borrowed this approach from the science of fluid
mechanics: for goods within the same market, prices and demand
would flow toward equality, but not across the market’s boundaries.
In 1890 Marshall brought the ideas of marginal utility and
equilibrium together in a way that made the analysis of market
behavior both tractable and useful. First he developed what came to be
known as the Marshallian demand curve, illustrating the inverse
relationship between price and output of a single commodity.49 The
downward slope of the demand curve is driven entirely by the next, or
“marginal,” buyer’s willingness to pay for one unit of that commodity.
The model ignored choices people might make about different

48

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
Famously specified in Milton Friedman, The Marshallian Demand Curve,
57 J. POL. ECON. 463 (1949), who also cites the lengthy history of conceptual
development up to that time. Marshall’s own specification appears in
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 159 n. 1 (1890).
49
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commodities, even though in a world of limited budgets these choices
could be relevant.
Marshall was not the first marginalist,50 but he did turn
marginalism into a practical tool of competition analysis. He explained
that he had come
to attach great importance to the fact that our observations of
nature, in the moral as in the physical world, relate not so much
to aggregate quantities, as to increments of quantities, and that
in particular the demand for a thing is a continuous function, of
which the "marginal" increment is, in stable equilibrium,
balanced against the corresponding increment of its cost.”51
For example, a firm would bid a selling offer by comparing the amount
of additional cost that production and sale would encounter and the
amount of additional revenue that it would produce.52
Marginalism provided a partial theory of individual firm
behavior, but not so obviously a theory of firm interaction and
competition. In order to do that, Marshall needed a mechanism for
identifying who in the economy competes with whom. This was in
contrast to earlier contemporaries such as Leon Walras and Marshall’s
own successor at Cambridge, Arthur Cecil Pigou, who were more
concerned with the economy as whole. Today this division roughly
separates macroeconomics and microeconomics.53
Marshall’s concern was to make economic analysis more
manageable by focusing on those firms that competed with one another
in an obvious way. He realized that everything in an economy affects
everything else, but the most important influences can be identified
50

See Howey, supra note __; Knight, Marginal Utility Economics, supra note
__.
51
MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES, Preface, x (1890).
52
Alfred Marshall did not use the term “marginal revenue” in reference to the
monopolist’s profit-maximizing output and price. Rather, he spoke of “net
revenue,” which appears to mean the same thing. See MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES, supra note __ at 458-459. For example, he concluded that in
the long run a monopolist might charge a little lower price in order to earn
higher profits sufficient to “recoup him” for the short run losses. Id. at 464465.
53
Criticized in Friedman, supra note __.
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and tracked. In the influential eighth edition of Principles, published
in 1920, Marshall observed that informational demands made it
necessary for people, with their “limited powers to go step by step;
breaking up a complex question, studying one bit at a time and at last
combining [their] partial solutions into a more or less complete
solution of the whole riddle.”54
His described his solution, which came to be known as partial
equilibrium analysis, this way:
The forces to be dealt with [in the economy are] so
numerous, that it is best to take a few at a time; and to work out
a number of partial solutions as auxiliaries to our main study.
Thus we begin by isolating the primary relations of supply,
demand and price in regard to a particular commodity. We
reduce to inaction all other forces by the phrase "other things
being equal": we do not suppose that they are inert, but for the
time we ignore their activity. This scientific device is a great
deal older than science: it is the method by which, consciously
or unconsciously, sensible men have dealt from time
immemorial with every difficult problem of ordinary life.55
This focus on individual industries quickly took over the entire
field of business economics, or “industrial organization,” as a distinct
field of economic inquiry. Today, antitrust has become a substantially
microeconomic discipline, certainly in litigation if not always in
theory.
Marshall set industrial organization economics on the path of
studying industries individually by identifying goods, which he termed
“commodities,” that were sufficiently similar that they could be said
to compete with each other. This assumption had numerous
implications that were relevant to antitrust. One was to invite questions
about exactly how to identify who was in such an industry and who
was not. A second was to consider whether the identity of the firms in
this grouping changed over time. A third was to make the analysis of
relationships among competitors, or “horizontal” relationships very
different from the analysis of vertical relationships.56 A fourth one was
54

ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 213 (8th ed. 1920).
Id, preface, xxvi (8th ed.).
56
See discussion infra text at notes __.
55
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a search for the conditions for furthering or undermining competition
once such a group of firms or their commodities had been defined.
Marshall clearly realized that in reality there is no such thing
as a single market that is completely isolated from the rest of the
economy. Partial equilibrium analysis, as it came to be called, was no
more than a working assumption – although a very important one for
making economic analysis manageable. The idea that groupings of
similar (competing) commodities should be industrial economics’
principal subject of study had a profound influence on antitrust policy.
By focusing on a relatively small number of firms whose products and
location were reasonably close to one another, economics could draw
powerful conclusions about how price and new market entry are
determined and how firms respond to one another’s decisions. One of
the most important antitrust tools to come out of this focus was the
idea of the “relevant market,” or the grouping of sales whose products
and prices are strongly influenced by one another.57
The late nineteenth century was the Golden Age of engineering and
science, including social science and economics. Alfred Marshall
borrowed his ideas about movement and equilibrium straight from
Newtonian physics: “When two tanks containing fluid are joined by a
pipe, the fluid, even though it be rather viscuous, which is near the pipe
in the tank with the higher level, will flow into the other,” he wrote.58
Further, “if several tanks are connected by pipes, the fluid in all will
tend to the same level . . .”59 Marshall appeared to be discussing fluid
mechanics. In fact, he was speaking of the principle of economic
substitution at the margin, which he defined as the tendency for prices
“to seek the same level everywhere,”60 just as the fluid in a tank.
Further, “unless some of the markets are in an abnormal condition, the
tendency soon becomes irresistible.”61 Within this model a “market”
57

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
ALFRED, PRINCIPLES, supra note __ at 45 (1890).
59
Id. at 46.
60
Id. at 387.
61
Ibid. He observed,
And similarly the law of substitution is constantly tending by indirect
routes to apportion earnings to efficiency between trades, and even
between grades, which are not directly in contact with one another,
and which appear at first sight to have no way of competing with one
another.
58
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was a closed system in which fluids moved naturally toward equality.
A different market would be a different enclosed system without any
flow from one system to the other.
Irving Fisher, a graduate student in the early 1890s who was to
become one of America’s most important early marginalists,
constructed a utility machine, illustrating with fluids controlled by
pumps and levers how prices within the same market flowed to an
equilibrium, but did not flow across market boundaries:62

The utility machine was thought to be so innovative that it was
scheduled for display at the Columbian Exhibition in Chicago in 1893,
but was destroyed in route.63 Other American economists also used
Id. at 706.
62
Irving Fisher, Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and
Prices, 9 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CONNECTICUT ACADEMY 28, 38 (July
1892).
63
See Robert W. Dimand and John Greanakoplos, Celebrating Irving Fisher:
the Legacy of a Great Economist, 64 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 3 (2005). See also
William C. Brainard & Herbert E. Scarf, How to Compute Equilibrium Prices
in 1891, 64 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 57 (2005). On the underlying mathematics,
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illustrations derived from fluid mechanics to illustrate the equilibrium
of prices in a market.64
Marshall’s conclusion that the fluids in a tank would flow to a level
equilibrium even though they were “rather viscuous,” presaged
another development in marginalist economics: the idea of “costs of
movement,” in the words of Marshall’s successor Arthur Cecil
Pigou.65 These later came to be known as “transaction costs.”66 The
idea was simply that the costs of moving resources to an equilibrium
varied considerably from one market situation to another, and in some
cases these costs prevented the movement altogether. As a result, one
feature of some markets was “chronic disequilibria,” as Joseph
Schumpeter observed in 1934.67
One thing that made marginalism attractive to the new
generation of young economists was its increased use of mathematics.
This was in line with contemporary thinking in all of the sciences and
social sciences that emphasized expertise and technique.68
Marginalist industrial economics also broke the bond that had
always existed between classical political economy and laissez fair
policy – at least until significant neoliberal pushback occurred in the
1940s. The classicists had been strenuous opponents of government
intervention in the economy, but the new Progressives were not.
Indeed, Marshall himself moved significantly to the left as he got

see Donald Brown and Felix Kubler, Comment, 64 AM. J. ECON. SOC. 85
(2005).
64
E.g., John Maurice Clark, A Contribution to the Theory of Competitive
Price, 28 Q.J. ECON. 747 (1914).
65
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 138-139 (4th ed. 1932).
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (2012).
66
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law
and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499, 503-510 (2011).
67
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Robinson's Economics of Imperfect Competition, 42
J. POL. ECON. 249, 256 (1934)
68
DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 98-140
(1991); MARY O. FURNER, ADVOCACY AND OBJECTIVITY: A CRISIS IN THE
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1865-1905 (1975).
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older.69 As the technical study of market competition under marginalist
principles developed, economists became increasingly concerned
about defining the conditions for “perfect” competition.
Accompanying this came the realization that the conditions are in fact
quite strict, and that nearly all markets deviated from them, although
some more than others.70 One thing that marginalism provided was a
set of tools for measuring these deviations, provided that the data were
available. Antitrust policy in turn became a tool for examining certain
industry structures and practices in order to determine whether they
were anticompetitive and, if so, whether they were subject to legal
correction.
Industrial Concentration

The idea that a meaningful correlation exists between the
number of firms in a market and its degree of competitiveness goes
back to Augustin Cournot, a French mathematician who wrote in the
mid-nineteen century.71 As the number of effective competitive
players in a market becomes smaller the margin between price and
marginal cost increases until it reaches the monopoly level with a
single firm. For more than a century, the relationship between
industrial concentration and competitive performance has been an
important component in competition policy, both at the legislative
level72 and more specifically in merger policy. Nevertheless, its role
has been controversial.73

69

According to John Maynard Keynes. See Keynes, Alfred Marshall, 18421923, 34 ECON. J. 311 (1924). See also Theodore Levitt, Alfred Marshall:
Victorian Relevance for Modern Economics, 90 Q. J. ECON. 425 (1976).
70
John Maurice Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM.
ECON. REV. 241 (1940).
71
AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (1838, Eng. Trans. By Nathaniel T.
Bacon, 1897). For a brief biographical introduction, see Antoine Augustin
Cournot, 1801-1877,
https://www.hetwebsite.net/het/profiles/cournot.htm.
72
E.g., Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 228-250 (1960) (on Congress’
concern in the 1940s with rising industrial concentration).
73
See INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEANING (Harvey J.
Goldschmid, H. Michael Mann, and J. Fred Weston, eds. 1974). See
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In order to have a measure of industrial concentration someone
needs to have a concept of an “industry,” and that is why partial
equilibrium analysis was an essential premise for talking about
industry concentration. Early on, marginalist economists began to
examine the relationship between market structure and industry
performance. As early as 1888 George Gunton used data from the
United States Census of Manufactures to conclude that over the
previous half century industrial concentration in some markets had
grown significantly.74 For example, in the cotton industry census data
from 1830 and 1880 showed that during that interval the amount of
capital invested in the industry grew fivefold, the amount of production
more than tenfold, but the number of firms had actually shrunk from
801 to 756.75 The data also showed that the amount of capital invested
per worker had roughly doubled, indicating that the firms were on
average becoming more capital intensive.76 Gunton also identified
railroading, telegraphing, petroleum production, and sugar as showing
greatly increased concentration.77
Gunton’s conclusions were not addressed to competitiveness.
He never discussed the relationship between the number of firms in a
market and the threat of oligopoly of collusion. He observed that some
had complained that the “concentration of capital tends to increase
prices,”78 but found no evidence of it. Rather, he found that most of
the facts “point the other way.” Prices in most of the industries that had
experienced higher concentration had actually gone down rather than
up.79 His also rejected the argument that “although these trusts have
constantly resulted in reducing prices,” still greater saving would result
“should the government run the business.”80 He then concluded that
the large firms were fundamentally a good thing.81
Lawrence J. White, Book Review, 76 Col. L. Rev. 1051 (1976) (noting variety
of positions and influence of emergent Chicago School).
74
George Gunton, The Economic and Social Aspect of Trusts, 3 POL. SCI. Q.
385, 391 (1888).
75
Id. at 391-392.
76
Ibid.
77
Id. at 392.
78
Id. at 390. Gunton did not identify who the complainers were.
79
Id. at 390 (sugar, freight, petroleum)
80
Id.at 398.
81
See id. at 406:
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Increasingly, however, economists and competition lawyers
became less sanguine. Boston attorney Lionel Norman lamented that
industrial concentration was proceeding at an alarming rate.82 Cornell
economist Jeremiah Jenks and Walter Clark, a professor of
mathematics and economics, were also much more pessimistic,83 as
were Progressive economists Richard T. Ely84 and Edwin R.A.
Seligman.85 Looking at the business landscape just after the turn of the
century, Seligman concluded that the “study of modern business
enterprise thus becomes virtually a study of concentration.”86 He also
relied heavily on data from the U.S. Census of Manufactures, which
showed rapidly increasing concentration around 1900, and a
significantly greater number of “combinations,” or firms that had
attained their large size by merger. All but one of the top 25

Manifestly, therefore, the charge that the concentration of capital in
the form of trusts and syndicates, necessarily tends to produce
monopoly (in the obnoxious sense), destroy competition, increase
prices, oppress labor, or to put the government into the hands of an
industrial oligarchy, is without any real foundation in fact, or
justification in reason. On the contrary, these institutions, instead of
being the evidence of industrial abnormity and economic disease, are
the natural consequence of modern industrial differentiation, and in
their nature are economically wholesome, and politically and
socially harmless.
Gunton did not attribute these charges to any particular person. See also
Charles Horton Cooley, The Theory of Transportation, 9 PUB. AM. ECON.
ASSN. 75-76, 109-120 (1894) (finding increasing concentration troublesome,
but acknowledging that it led to lower costs).
82
Lionel Norman, Legal restraints on Modern Industrial Combinations and
Monopolies in the United States, 33 AM. L. REV. 499 (1899).
83
JEREMIAH WHIPPLE JENKS, THE TRUST PROBLEM 15-19 (1901). He was
joined in several later editions by Walter Clark.
84

RICHARD T. ELY, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 4247(1901) (“Readers can readily gather from census and trade reports many
similar illustrations of this concentration of business, which is one of the
main causes of the existence of present economic problems”). Ely ultimately
recommended expanded public ownership. Id. at 264.
85
EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO AMERICAN CONDITIONS (1905).
86
Id., 330.
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combinations had been formed between 1890 and 1904.87 On effects,
he noted both the possibility of lower costs but higher profits.88 He also
noted that higher profits did not necessarily mean higher prices,
because higher output and lower prices could also be profitable.89 He
seemed particularly troubled by the fact that the trusts earned higher
margins, even if they sold at lower prices.90
Prominent railroad economist and Harvard Professor William
Z. Ripley also undertook a comprehensive examination of industrial
concentration data derived from the Census of Manufactures.91 The
two census figures he found to be most informative were those of the
number of firms in each consecutive five year census period, and the
value of their gross product.92 He concluded that in 142 out of the 322
industries grouped in the census the number of firms had declined, and
there had been significant increases in per firm output. He was able to
group industries by their tendency toward monopoly, simply by
examining the trend toward increased concentration.93 “Concentration
varies more or less directly with the degree of monopolization,” he
concluded.94
These writers generally assumed a correlation between the data
contained in the Census reports and the markets that Alfred Marshall
referred to for partial equilibrium analysis. In fact, the census data
correlated very poorly with the “relevant market” of antitrust law. For
example, one classification in the 1909 Census of Manufactures was
“furniture and refrigerators,” which included both metal and wood
furniture of all kinds, as well as wooden iceboxes and metal

87

Id. at 342-343. See the Table, p. 343, which ranks the largest combinations.
United States Steel is at the top, followed by American Tobacco Co., and
then American Smelting and Refining.
88
Id. at 347.
89
Id., 347.
90
Id., 347.
91
William Z. Ripley, Industrial Concentration as Shown by the Census, 21
Q. J. ECON. 651 (1907).
92
Id. at 652.
93
Id. at 655.
94
Id. at 657.
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refrigerators, which were first coming into commercial use.95 This very
poor fit between industry census data and antitrust markets has served
to weaken conclusions about industry competitiveness from census
classifications – something that some Progressive economists realized
already at the turn of the century.96 This poor correlation has remained
to this day as a problem with the measurement of industrial
concentration through the use of census data.97 Nevertheless, data of
this type have been in continuous use to produce measures of industry
competitiveness ever since the late nineteenth century.98
The use of concentration data drawn mainly from the Census
of Manufactures has had a controversial but durable history in antitrust
policy, notwithstanding significant weaknesses. The Chicago School
largely rejected its significance, opting for a position more like George
Gunton’s that the aggregation of large firms resulted mainly in greater
efficiency and lower prices.99 Numerous other scholars from the
mainstream and further left have disagreed.100 In the mid-1970s the
debate produced a major and influential conference collecting
95

9 DEPT. OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, MANUFACTURES 806, 1046
and many other places (1909).
96
See Balthaser H. Meyer, et al, Trusts-Discussion, 5 PUB. AM. ECON. ASSN.
108 (May 1904) (acknowledging that the data were not well designed to
answer questions about changes in the number and size of firm and the
propensity of a market toward collusion or trust formation). Meyer was an
economist at the University of Wisconsin who also served several years as a
member of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
97
See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS.
Org. 714 (2018) (observing the poor correlation between the census data and
relevant markets).
98
E.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF
FOREIGN TRADE 98-99 (1945); ORRIS C. HERFINDAHL, CONCENTRATION IN
THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY (1950). See also CLAIR WILCOX, COMPETITION
AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (TNEC Monograph, 1940). The
FTC raised some alarm in FTC, THE PRESENT TREND OF CORPORATE
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (1947), a preclude to the 1950 CellerKefauver amendment to §7 of the Clayton Act.
99

E.g., George J. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 AM. ECON. REV.
23 (1950).
100

For example, Ralph Nader. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Economic
Regulation vs. Competition: Ralph Nader and Creeping Capitalism, 82
YALE L.J. 890 (1973).
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representatives from both sides.101 That book hardly put the debate to
rest, however, and census-driven concentration data continues to find
a controversial but important place in debates about American
competitiveness. For example, the Biden Administration’s 2021
Presidential Executive Order on American competitiveness lamented
declining competition and relied on concentration data to make the
point.102
Fixed Costs and Competitive Equilibrium

Both marginalism as a theory of value and Marshall’s theory
of equilibrium made cost classification essential. In fact, for Marshall
the cost problem produced significant frustration. Competition drives
prices to marginal cost which, by definition, are costs encountered for
each incremental change in output. But if hard competition drives
prices to marginal costs, then how could a firm pay off its other costs?
Marshall used the term “marginal cost” to describe the
immediate additional cost that a firm faced when it increased output
by a single unit. In a chapter on the “Equilibrium of Normal Demand
and Supply”103 he observed that under what he called “free
competition” prices would be driven to a level very close to this
cost.,104 and this would become a stable equilibrium.105
Marshall’s theory of marginal cost was an effort to determine
how firms decide on prices. He observed that prices are related to costs
but not all costs are the same. Some costs seem to be quite unrelated
to a firm’s decision about what price to charge, at least over the short
101

INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, supra note __. See
the review by Richard R. Nelson, 7 BELL J. ECON. 729 (1976); and Frederic
M. Scherer, The Causes and Consequences of Rising Industrial
Concentration, 22 J.L. & ECON. 191 (1979); Sam Peltzman, The Gains and
Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20 J. L. & ECON. 229 (1977).
102
Exec. Order No. 14036 on Promoting Competition in the American
Economy, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021). For antitrust analysis, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, President Biden’s Executive Order on Competition: an
Antitrust Analysis, __ ARIZ. L. REV. (2022) (in press), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3887776.
103
Id. at 399, 704. Marshall used the term “marginal cost(s)” three times in
the 1890 edition but 56 times in the 8th edition.
104
Id. at 412.
105
Id at 535.
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run. This included administrative costs as well as depreciation on plant
and durable equipment.106 In calculating whether a particular price is
immediately profitable the firm largely ignores these costs. Marshall
identified “total cost” as the sum of these supplemental costs plus
marginal costs.”107 In the short run each additional sale would add to a
firm’s profit so long as it was at a price that exceeded the firm’s
marginal costs.
Marshall never used the terms “fixed costs” and “variable
costs.” He devoted an entire chapter to “cost of production,” which
spoke of “prime costs,” “total costs,” and “marketing costs.” The
words “prime” and “direct” were almost always used as references to
what we would call variable costs.108 Within prime costs he included:
The (money) cost of raw material used in making the
commodity and the wages of that part of the labour spent on it
which is paid by the day or the week.109
He excluded salaries such as are paid to management because these
did not vary with output over the short run.110
Marshall also noted, however, that for goods that require a
“very expensive plant” the “supplementary” costs is a “large part of
their total cost.” As a result, a “normal price” “may leave a large
surplus above their prime cost.” In today’s terminology, in order to be
profitable a business with high fixed costs would have to charge a
premium above its variable costs. He also observed what would
become a significant problem for establishing equilibrium in markets
with high fixed costs. “[I]n their anxiety to prevent their plant from
being idle” producers may “glut the market.” If they “pursue this
policy constantly and without moderation,” price may be so low “as to
drive capital out of the trade, ruining many of those employed in it,

106

On Marshall and the operative types of cost, see Ragnar Frisch, Alfred
Marshall’s Theory of Value, 64 Q.J.ECON. 495 (1950).
107
MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES (1890), supra note __, Ch. 6.
108
MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES (1890), supra note __, at 452, 518-519, 522. In
fact, Marshall devoted Chapter VI to “cost of production,” which classified
a large number of costs.
109
Id. at 519.
110
Ibid.
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themselves perhaps among the number”111 When firms are under
“keen competition” this urge becomes inevitable, and firms “whose
business is of this kind … are under a great temptation” to sell “at
much less than normal cost.”112
Marshall’s problem was getting an equilibrium that would
sustain a market that was both competitive and had high fixed costs –
an increasingly prominent feature of industrial production. By his
Eighth edition in 1920 Marshall had come up with a largely
unsatisfactory biological model to explain how firms with significant
fixed costs might attain equilibrium. Firms were like trees in a forest,
he explained. They have individual lifecyles, and thus come and go,
and some never survive infancy.113 This organic metaphor never fit
very well into the emergent neoclassical model of equilibrium that
looked strictly at the mathematics of profit-maximization.114
During the formative years of antitrust policy in the United
States a “fixed cost controversy” produced by Marshall’s model of
competition dominated important debates about the appropriate roles
of competition policy or regulatory policy.115 In industries such as the
railroads or heavy steel manufacturing, the argument went, “ruinous”
competition would occur because firms would be forced to cut their
prices toward marginal cost, leaving insufficient revenue to pay of
their fixed costs. The equilibrium solutions were the emergence of
monopoly, perhaps by merger, collusion, or price regulation. These
concerns were very likely a major contributing factor to the great
111

Id. at 520.
Id. at 640.
113
MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES (8th ed. 1920), supra note __ at 315-316. He even
used different species of trees as a metaphor for “different branches of
industry.” Id. at 434. On Marshall’s changing use of the trees metaphor
through successive editions, see Douglas C. Hague, Alfred Marshall and the
Competitive Firm, 68 ECON. J. 673 (1958).
114
On the role of the biological model in addressing the equilibrium problem,
see Neil Hart, Marshall’s Dilemma: Equilibrium versus Evolution, 37 J.
ECON. ISSUES 1139 (2003). On the subsequent debate over equilibrium
within Marshall’s framework, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase,
Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499
(2011).
115
The debate is recounted in HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND
AMERICAN LAW, 1936-1937, Ch. 23 (1991).
112
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merger wave that occurred around the turn of the twentieth century.116
Antitrust lawyers representing cartel defendants in markets with high
fixed costs repeatedly asserted a “ruinous competition” defense to
price fixing, but the federal courts consistently rejected it,117 as they
have to this day.118
On the other side, several of the more left leaning Progressives
denied that there was any such thing as chronic overproduction.119 By
rejecting the defendants’ arguments, the Supreme Court was
effectively taking their position. In the Joint-Traffic case the Court
expressed strong doubts about the ruinous competition argument,
concluding that the principal consequence of very low rates was
increased demand, which would in turn produce a larger supply.120
Justice Peckham’s clever response to the defense in the Addyston Pipe
case was that, whether or not competition was ruinous, the defendants
themselves could not be trusted to set a price no higher than necessary
to prevent it. In fact, it had set prices so high as to deprive the public
116

See NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904 (1988); George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing
Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case, 25
J.L. & ECON. 201 (1982) (generalizing from the railroads to heavy
manufacturing industries).
117
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 368-369
(1897) (rejecting defense that competition would push railroads to “ruinous
extremes”); United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 576 (1898)
(rejecting ruinous competition defense); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S. 211, 213-214 (1899) (same); United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-221 (1940) (same, dicta); Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 346 (1982) (same, dicta).
118
More recently, see United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 332 (2d Cir.
2015) (same, dicta, in the market for ebooks, which also have very high fixed
costs).
119
RICHARD T. ELY, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 149
(1891); see also HENRY SEAGER, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS 160-61
(1904) (arguing against general overproduction); EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 584-86 (3d ed. 1908) (the problem is not
overproduction, but rather overcapitalization based on expectations of future
orders); Charles J. Bullock, Trust Literature: A Survey and a Criticism, 15
Q.J. ECON. 167, 205-10 (1901) (rejecting a general overproduction problem;
“the evils of competition are greatly exaggerated”').
120
Joint-Traffic, 171 U.S. at 576.
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of the advantages of any competition.121 The court also cited cost
evidence developed below that had concluded that the reasonable cost
of the defendants’ pipe, including a fair profit, did not exceed $15 per
ton and could have been delivered profitably to Atlanta for $17 to $18
per ton, but the bid price was actually $24.25 per ton.122 That statement
at least suggested that one judicial response to a ruinous competition
defense could be a judicial inquiry into costs, but the Court never
pursued that route. It simply rejected the defense outright, as it has
always done ever since.
Theorizing about the behavior of firms with high fixed costs
became a central focus of early antitrust literature, as well as the early
American economic literature on the theory of industrial
organization.123 It also proved to be a general attack on the model of
perfect competition.
Prior to the development of imperfect and monopolistic
competition models in the early 1930s124 the principal Progressive
theorist of the role of fixed costs was the Institutionalist economist
John Maurice Clark. Clark found the existence of significant fixed
costs, which he termed “overhead” costs, to be a disruptor of the
standard notion of the equilibrium of supply and demand under
competition.125 The problem, as he noted, was that in the short run of
immediate demand price and output are determined by demand and
marginal cost, but in the presence of fixed costs this could be attained
only over some longer run.126 High fixed costs continuously produced
“irregularities” that threw the relationship between demand and supply
out of balance, with some periods of excess capacity and others of
excessive demand.127 Echoing Marshall, he observed that “where
overhead costs are a substantial item, the perfect theoretical
equilibrium is not found.”128
121

Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 236-237 (1899).
Id. at 237.
123
See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Movement, supra note __ at 122-143.
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See discussion infra, text at notes __.
125
JOHN MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD
COSTS 463 (1923).
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Id. at 464.
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Id. at 465.
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The implications, as Clark worked them out, were chronic
overproduction in plants with excess capacity, because any price above
short run marginal cost would serve to reduce the deficit in payment
of fixed costs.129 Another result was that price discrimination became
a profitable strategy to the extent that a firm was able to maintain
higher prices on established demand while bidding a lower price for
new sales.130 One characteristic of price discrimination as a solution to
the problem of high fixed costs is that when it occurs it results in
increased output. Clark concluded that there was nothing inherently
anticompetitive or even suspicious about most instances of price
discrimination.131 They were simply a mechanism that firms used to
sell individual batches or product at a profit-maximizing (or lossminimizing) price. That view has very largely persisted within antitrust
policy.
The Marshall equilibrium problem ultimately went away when
economic models began to incorporate product differentiation,
particularly in the theory of monopolistic competition.132 The principal
problem had been that Marshall’s assumption that all sellers in
competition sold identical “commodities.” As a result, firms competed
only on price. When differences in the product or even the terms of
sale were incorporated it became possible to have equilibrium without
relying on any non-economic theorizing about the nature of the firm.
The significance of this debate, which occurred almost entirely during
the Progressive and New Deal eras, is difficult to exaggerate. It gave
us much of our theory about equilibrium in industrial markets, analysis
of costs, and theories about the limits of competition and the
appropriate scope of regulation.133 It also fueled the Harvard School
view that markets differ from one another, and antitrust policy thus
requires intense factual queries into particular industries and practices.
Id. at 469 (“with some capacity unused the differential cost of producing
more goods is low, and it pays to sell them for anything above differential
cost, but if all goods are sold as cheap as this, the concern will not even cover
all its operating expenses.”).
130
Id. at 469. See also Id., at 428-433
131
Id. at 2-4.
132
The developments are briefly recounted in MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC
THEORY IN RETROSPECT 375-378 (5th ed. 1996).
133
See Hovenkamp, Regulation and Marginalist Revolution, supra note __ at
454-470, 484-492.
129
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Price Discrimination

Price discrimination, which technically refers to selling to two or
more customers at different ratios of price to cost, has always produced
divisions in antitrust policy, most typically between economists and
non-economists. Lawyers often view it with suspicion, something like
race or gender discrimination. By contrast, economists have always
tended to be more circumspect, and more inclined to divide it up into
different varieties. Even a Progressive institutionalist economist such
as John Maurice Clark discussed it in relatively benign terms.
Minnesota economist and eventual Director of the United States
Census Edward Dana Durand probably stated the consensus view
among Progressive economists. In a critique of the Clayton Act he
observed that price discrimination “is an all but universal practice and
is not necessarily injurious or calculated to bring about monopoly.”134
However, he also observed that price discrimination could be a
strategy of selective predatory pricing used to drive competitors out of
the market.135
Most of the economic foundations for our understanding of price
discrimination developed during the Progressive Era as an outgrowth
of marginal analysis. The principal originator of the modern theory
was Arthur Cecil Pigou, successor to Alfred Marshall’s Chair at the
University of Cambridge.136 Pigou divided price discrimination into
three types, which he named first-, second-, and third- degree price
discrimination. First-degree, or “perfect” price discrimination is an
analogue of perfect competition: it never exists in the real world but is
a good tool for analysis. Under it a seller sells every unit at that
customer’s reservation price, or the highest price the customer is
willing to pay. The result is that output is restored to the competitive
level but there is no consumers’ surplus.137

134

Edward Dana Durand, The Trust Legislation of 1914, 29 Q. J. ECON. 72
(1914).
135
Id. at 79.
136
On Pigou, see IAN KUMEKAWA, THE FIRST SERIOUS OPTIMIST: A.C.
PIGOU AND THE BIRTH OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (2017)
137
For Pigou’s classification, see ARTHUR C. PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE II.17.6 (4th ed. 1932). On the three degrees of price discrimination
and antitrust policy, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §14.4 (6th ed. 2020).
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Second-degree price discrimination occurs when the seller adopts
a discriminatory pricing formula and the buyer “chooses” its price by
selecting how to purchase. A quantity discount schedule is one
prominent example. The purchaser can obtain a lower price by buying
more.
In third degree price discrimination the seller preselects categories
of customers based on certain observed characteristics and charges
them different prices – for example, one price for commercial users
and another for residential users.
United States antitrust law has never developed general antitrust
rules governing price discrimination. Section 2 of the Clayton Act,
subsequently amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, addressed a
practice that it called “price discrimination.”138 But the set of practices
that statute reached often had nothing to do with economic price
discrimination. Rather, the statute simply condemned price
differences.139 The Progressives did often identify predatory price
discrimination as one of the evils brought about by the trusts,
particularly Standard Oil.140 The result was original §2 of the of the
Clayton Act,141 which the Robinson-Patman Act later amended. The
138

15 U.S.C. §13.
See 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶2320a (4th ed. 2019).
140
E.g., 2 IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY
31-63 (1904). See Christopher Leslie, Revisiting the Revisionist History of
Standard Oil, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 573 (2012).
141
The original Clayton Act §2 provided:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities.., where the effect of such discrimination may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce: Provided, That nothing herein contained
shall prevent discrimination in price between purchasers of
commodities on account of differences in the grade, quality, or
quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance
for difference in the cost of selling or transportation, or
discrimination in price in the same or different communities made
in good faith to meet competition: And provided further, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling
goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their
139
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original statute was intended to reach a particular form of predatory
pricing widely attributed to the Standard Oil Company as well as
others.142 The House Judiciary Committee report on the provision
indicated that its purpose was to target the practice of large
corporations of using local price cutting intended to destroy a
competitor.143 In a 1923 decision the Second Circuit described the
condemned practice this way:
It is a matter of common knowledge that prior to the
enactment of the Clayton Act a practice had prevailed among large
corporations of lowering the prices asked for their products in a
particular locality in which their competitors were operating for
the purpose of driving a rival out of business. Such lowering of
prices was maintained within the particular locality while the
normal or higher prices were maintained in the rest of the country;
and this practice was continued until the smaller rival was driven
out of business, whereupon the prices in that locality would be put
back to the normal level maintained in the rest of the country. The
Clayton Act was aimed at that evil.144
The statute did not explicitly require that the lower price be below
cost, but that was largely the way it came to be interpreted, 145 even
though the Supreme Court initially construed the statute broadly
without discussing any requirement of below cost pricing.146 Further,
own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of
trade.
142
On the early litigation history, see Breck P. McAllister, Sales Policies and
Price Discrimination Under the Clayton Act, 41 YALE L.J. 418 (1932).
143
REPORT OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 63d Cong., 2d. Sess.,
Misc. H. R. Rep., v. 2, no. 627, May 6, 1914, at 8 (“This section expressly
forbids discrimination in price ... when such discrimination is made with the
purpose or intent to thereby destroy or wrongfully injure the business of a
competitor either of such dealer or seller.”).
144
Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 F. 774, 778-779 (2d Cir. 1923). The court went
on to include that the defendant’s practice of refusing to charge retailers the
same price as wholesalers was not a violation.
145
See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prds. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963)
(requiring sales “below cost” in order to protect the statute from a void for
vagueness Constitutional challenge).
146
See George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245
(1929) (not addressing whether the statute required the lower price to be
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the statute’s express limitation to “commodities” meant that it could
not apply to things such as railroad rates, which were one of the biggest
targets of price discrimination concern.147
John Maurice Clark’s important 1923 book on fixed costs made a
convincing argument that, setting aside differences in bargaining
relationships or customer sophistication, price discrimination is largely
a consequence of fixed costs.148 A firm with a heavy fixed cost
investment needs to keep its output up, and any sale at a price greater
than incremental costs will improve its bottom line. When a firm has
excess capacity, these pressures are great. That justification for price
discrimination was already known in the railroad industry by Clark’s
time. Forty years earlier Yale economist and eventual President Arthur
Twining Hadley had made a similar observation in justifying railroads’
policies of charging different freight rates for different commodities
depending on the shippers’ willingness to pay. By doing this the
railroads were able to maximize output, and given their high fixed
costs this meant that the average cost of transportation went down.149
The Robinson-Patman Act was passed in 1936, subsequent to the
period under discussion here. It was not a way of approaching the
problem of fixed costs. The statute condemned many of the things that
Clark’s analysis had explained as causing no competitive harm. In any
event, the Robinson-Patman Act was a complete misfire. The concern
motivating the statute was the emergence of large chain stores such as
A&P, which had become the nation’s largest grocer. A&P drove many
smaller grocers out of business, mainly because it was vertically
integrated and also because it was able to purchase in large quantities,
enabling it to undersell small grocery stores.

below cost). See Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d
234 (2d Cir. 1929) (price discrimination among buyers of cigarettes unlawful
when the lower price was below cost); American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning
Co., 44 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1930). See also William S. Stevens, Unfair
Competition, 29 POL. SCI. Q. 282, 284 (1914).
147
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age:
Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1050-1055
(1988).
148
CLARK, OVERHEAD COSTS, supra note __.
149
ARTHUR TWINING HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION: ITS HISTORY
AND ITS LAWS 117 (1885).
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But the statute was not at all effective in reaching vertical
integration because of its requirement that both the higher priced and
lower priced transactions be “sales.”150 The vertical passage of a good
from a firm to its wholly owned store or other subsidiary was not a
“sale,” as the courts repeatedly held.151 Further, because the statute
targeted “sales” it did not effectively reach powerful buyers such as A
& P. The statute did contain a buyers’ liability provision, almost as an
afterthought, which was never very effective.152 It did condemn a few
large suppliers, such as Borden, for selling milk to large grocers at a
lower price than to small grocers.153
During the Progressive Era through the new deal the antitrust
analysis of price discrimination was spotty and indeterminate. The fact
is, however, that it remains indeterminate to this day. We have never
developed good theory for generalizing about the competitive effects
of price discrimination. The consensus of economists today is probably
not much different from what it was in the 1920s and 1930s – namely,
most instances are competitively harmless, particularly if the
discrimination tends to increase output.154
Assessing Power: Potential Competition, Barriers to Entry, and the Relevant
Market

In 1890, when the Sherman Act was passed, legal doctrine did not
have a coherent conception of market power as a measurable presence,
and economics was just beginning to develop it. Judicial decisions
contained plenty of discussions of “monopoly,” but virtually always in
relation to patents or other grants of exclusive rights. In most cases
“monopoly” was simply assumed from the existence of the grant itself.
150

See 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶2312 (4th ed. 2019).
See 14 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note __, ¶2311. See, e.g.,
Security Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gates Rubber Co., 598 F.2d 962, 966 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979) (“transfers from a parent corporation
to its wholly owned subsidiary” not a “sale” under the Act); Snyder v.
Howard Johnson’s Motor Lodges, Inc., 412 F.Supp. 724 (S.D.Ill. 1976)
(intra-firm transfers not a “sale” under Robinson-Patman Act).
152
14 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note __, ¶2361.
153
FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966) (condemning Borden for selling
its name brand and house brand milk at different prices); FTC v. Morton Salt
Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (condemning Morton salt for quantity discount
program that was not justified by cost savings).
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See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note __, §14.5.
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The law dealing with various aspects of monopoly came essentially
from three sources: patent and copyright law, the common law of
unfair competition and contracts in restraint of trade, and state
corporation law. None contained a market power requirement, and
power was generally either assumed or irrelevant.
Estimation of market power by reference to the share of a relevant
market, as it is used today in antitrust cases, is a relatively late arrival.
Today it has become so conventional that we regard it as routine, and
in 2018 a divided Supreme Court mistakenly concluded as a matter of
law that it is the only way to assess power in a vertical case.155
Econometric tools such as the Lerner Index were actually developed
earlier.156 Today econometric methods often produce better results
than traditional measurement.157 Further, the use of econometric
devices are fundamentally inconsistent with the model of perfect
competition. The firms within a perfectly competitive market have no
power to price above marginal cost. Implicit in the index, and later in
the development of more sophisticated econometric tools for assessing
the power of individual firms, is that the firms are not operating in
perfectly competitive markets.158
From Potential Competition to Exclusionary Practices

The belief that trusts both promised lower costs and threatened
higher prices at least partly explains the focus on “potential
competition” as a disciplinary tool. Even a dominant trust would not
charge monopoly prices if the looming threat of competition was
sufficient to keep its prices down.159 Classical political economists had
155

Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2285 n. 7 (2018).
In Abba P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of
Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157 (1934).
157
See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437
(2010).
158
See id. On the use of such methods in antitrust cases, see 2B PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶521 (5th ed. 2020).
159
Justice Brandeis would have required either the erection of barriers to
potential competition or “flagrant” oppression of the weak by the strong. See
FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929), per J. Brandeis:
156

To justify filing a complaint the public interest must be specific and
substantial. Often it is so, because the unfair method employed
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always assumed that any attempt to charge monopoly prices would
invite new competitive entry that would drive prices back down. About
the only things that would prevent this were government restrictions
on entry, including patents.
In his 1884 critique of traditional political economy Richard T.
Ely, who was to become one of the most prominent Progressive
economists, caricatured the classical assumptions of easy market entry,
which he described as
the absolute lack of friction in economic movements. Not only do
capital and labor move with perfect ease from place to place and
from employment to employment, but this … is accomplished
without the slightest loss….160
Under this image of the economy, Ely continued:
The silk manufacturer diverts his capital into another employment
like the construction of locomotives with precisely the same
facility with which he turns his family carriage horse from an
avenue into a cross street, while the Manchester laborer on a
moment’s warning finds a suitable purchaser for his immovable
effects and without expense or loss of time transfers himself to
London where employment is at once offered him at the rate of
wages there current. Equality of profits and equality of wages
flowed naturally from these assumptions.161
By contrast, the emerging discipline of industrial economics
began to consider how long this might realistically take, what were the
market factors that determined the speed and scope of new entry, and
the power of incumbent firms to throw obstacles in the way. Privately
created barriers emerged as a concern of antitrust law early in the
Progressive Era. They were undoubtedly heightened by the
Progressives’ increased sensitivity to the natural coercive power of
threatens the existence of present or potential competition.
Sometimes, because the unfair method is being employed under
circumstances which involve flagrant oppression of the weak by the
strong.
160
RICARD T. ELY, THE PAST AND THE PRESENT OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 12
(1884).
161
Ibid.
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markets.162 The Supreme Court recognized one such barrier already in
1904. In an early private action under the Sherman Act the Supreme
Court condemned a guild rule that limited membership and effectively
prohibited market participation by tile layers who were not members
of the defendant organization.163 Members of the association were
prohibited from dealing with non-members. As Justice Peckham noted
in his opinion for a unanimous Court, the association’s rules prohibited
dealers from acquiring tile “upon any terms” from members of the
guild, and all of the manufacturers in the area were members.164 A few
years later in the American Tobacco case the Court referred to a
dominant firm’s vertical integration and market foreclosure as creating
“perpetual barriers to the entry of others into the tobacco trade….”165
Some lower courts were much more sanguine. For example, in United
States v. Quaker Oats Co.,166 the court rejected the government’s claim
of attempt to monopolize, noting that the product at issue, packaged
rolled oats, was a commodity produced by many firms, and that the
defendant had no reasonable means of excluding them.167
Most of the participants in the multi-disciplinary proceedings
of the Chicago Conference on Trusts saw potential competition as
crucial to any assessment of market power, although they disagreed
about its effectiveness. The debates revealed that the classical
assumption of free entry had become controversial. For example,
Jeremiah Jenks was a skeptic. He acknowledged the existence of
potential competition as a disciplinary force, but doubted that the
power of the large trusts to charge high prices would be effectively
controlled.168
Attorney A. Leo Weil was less concerned. He observed that the
trusts generally reduced costs and prices, but if there were any
tendency toward price increases potential competition from new firms
would tamp them down. Further, this new entry could be expected to
occur “unless the laws of trade are to be reversed….”169 Statistician
162

See discussion supra, text at notes __.
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Id. at 44.
165
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 183, 190 (1911).
163

166
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Statement of A. Leo Weil, id. at 89.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3995502

2022

Progressivism’s Antitrust Toolbox

39

Joseph Nimmo observed that as a consequence of the revolution in
railroad transportation the range of potential competition was much
wider than it had been previously.170 Economist James R. Weaver from
De Pauw University was even less concerned. He suggested that
potential competition “rarely fails” to aid the consumer.
Accumulations of capital were easily assembled, and those who
controlled it stood “ready to enter any specific field of production,
whenever the profits of the industry offer sufficient inducement.”171
Further, it was well known that at the present time entrepreneurs were
sitting on “a great mass of idle capital.” As a result, “to avoid this new
competition, prices must be lowered or profits shared with the
consumer.”172 Francis B. Thurber, the President of the United States
Export Association believed that the trusts merely moved competition
to a higher and more beneficial level:
If a combination of capital in any line temporarily exacts a liberal
profit, immediately capital flows into that channel, another
combination is formed, and competition ensues on a scale and
operates with an intensity far beyond anything that is possible on
a smaller scale, resulting in breaking down of the combination and
the decline of profits to a minimum.173
By contrast, John Bates Clark, the most prominent economist
among the participants, was much more skeptical.174 In theory, he
observed “potential competition … is the power that holds trusts in
check.” But “at present it is not an adequate regulator.” The “potential
competitor encounters unnecessary obstacles when he tries to become
an active competitor.”175 He mentioned patents as one obstacle, but
refused to endorse abolition of the patent system.176 He was also more
170
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174
John Bates Clark, address on “The Necessity of Suppressing Monopolies
While Retaining Trusts,” id. at 404. Clark had developed these ideas
previously in John Bates Clark, The Limits of Competition, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 45
(1887); see also John Bates Clark, Monopolies and the Law, 16 POL. SCI. Q.
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cynical about the railroads, which he regarded as using manipulation
of shipping rates as a device for deterring potential competition.177
Clark also blamed selective price discrimination – or the power of the
trusts to exclude entrants by charging unreasonably low prices in that
particular portion of the market where new entry was threatened.178 A
particularly pernicious form of price discrimination was selective
predatory pricing:
The ability to make discriminating prices puts a terrible power
into the hands of a trust. If … it can sell goods at prices that are
below the cost of making them, while it sustains itself by
charging high prices in a score of other fields, it can crush me
without itself sustaining any injury. If, on the other hand, it
were obliged, in order to attack me, to lower the prices of all
its goods, wherever they might be sold, it would be in danger
of ruining itself in the pursuit of its hostile object. Its losses
would be proportionate to the magnitude of its operations.179
This observation became the theory under which original §2 of
the Clayton Act was passed in 1914 – namely to prevent firms from
using selective, geographically limited discounts to drive rivals out of
business.180 Finally, Clark opposed tariffs because their higher costs
deterred the potential competitor “from becoming an actual one.”181
Several years later Clark was even more pessimistic.182 At one
time potential competition may have been more effective at keeping
177
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Ibid.
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180
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John Bates Clark, The Possibility of Competition in Commerce and
Industry, 42 ANNALS, AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 63 (1912). Largely in
agreement was ARTHUR S. DEWING, CORPORATE PROMOTIONS AND
REORGANIZATIONS (1914). See also the similar contribution by John
Maurice Clark, John Bates Clark’s son, A Contribution to the Theory of
Competitive Price, 28 Q. J. Econ. 747 (1914); and also Robert L. Raymond,
Industrial Combinations—Existing Law and Suggested Legislation, 20
J.Pol.Econ. 309 (1912):
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prices down, he acknowledged, but today that power had largely been
eliminated by incumbent firms’ use of selective preferential rates, local
discrimination, and exclusionary agreements.183 Clark then gave a
strong endorsement to the Sherman Act, although he believed that
more was necessary, including a federal law chartering corporations
and an “industrial commission” designed to exam the competitiveness
of individual large firms. Further, he would impose on them “a burden
of proof,” first to show that they do not dominate the entire market and,
secondly, to show that “that the way is so open for the entrance of more
that prices cannot become extortionate.”184
Prominent Progressive economist Henry Carter Adams agreed
in his 1903 essay on the trusts,185 as did Robert L. Raymond.186
Raymond argued what came to be a common position held by
Progressives – that potential competition was natural and ordinarily to
be expected, but that dominant firms could devise practices that would
prevent or limit its operation. He also observed that potential
competition did not “instantaneously” become actual competition.
Rather, “even with abundant capital one cannot erect a steel
manufacturing plant or a sugar refinery until considerable time has
elapsed.”187 This delay, he observed, gave dominant firms an
opportunity to behave strategically.188 He also warned, however, that
competition policy should not go further; it had to preserve the “true
economic value” that they promised while also preserving the power
of potential competition to limit their prices.189 Progressive economist
Richard T. Ely, who published his book on monopolies and trusts
From a theoretical point of view competition, actual or potential, will
not permit the existence of monopoly control. What would happen
in theory can, I believe, be made to occur in fact. At present it does
not represent the usual course of events. Effective in theory, potential
competition under actually existing circumstances is impotent.
Id. at 313.
183
Clark, The Possibility of Competition, supra note __ at 64.
184
Id. at 66.
185
HENRY C. ADAMS, TRUSTS (1904) (reprinted from Papers and
Proceedings of the American Economic Association, Dec. 1903).
186
Robert L. Raymond, A Statement of the Trust Problem, 16 HARV. L. REV.
79 (1902).
187
Id at 90-91.
188
Id. at 91.
189
Id. at 93.
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simultaneously with the conference, expressed extreme doubts about
potential competition as a device for disciplining monopoly. He
concluded that “no evidence has been adduced of the sufficient action
of potential competition in the case of monopoly.”190
Clark returned to this problem in The Control of Trusts, a book
he had had originally published in 1901.191 For subsequent editions he
was joined by his son, John Maurice Clark.192 The revised edition was
even more pessimistic than John Bates’ original. “When the first
edition of this work was issued, so called potential competition had
shown its power to control prices,” the Clarks lamented, but
The potentiality of unfair attacks by the trust tended to destroy
the potentiality of competition. Under these conditions it was
and is clearly necessary to disarm the trusts —to deprive them
of the special weapons with which they deal their unfair blows.
It is necessary to repress the specific practices referred to and
so to enable every competitor who, by reason of productive
efficiency, has a right to stay in the field, to retain his place and
render his service to the public.193
As a result, they concluded, while experience has shown that “potential
competition is a real force, it has also shown that it is a force which
can be easily obstructed.”194 A few years later John Maurice Clark
argued that potential competition was an unlikely discipline for
monopoly in market with “heavy permanent investment” – i.e., with
high fixed costs.195 In such cases, he noted, incumbent firms will be
holding excess capacity and be able to expand their own output in
response to new entry. Knowing this, potential competitors will not
wish to make a significant investment in entry.196 Further, he observed,
prospective entrants into such a market would realize that total output
would be higher when their own production was added in, and thus
190

RICHARD T. ELY, MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS 251 (1900).
JOHN BATES CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS: AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR
OF CURBING THE POWER OF MONOPOLY BY A NATURAL METHOD (1901).
192
JOHN BATES CLARK AND JOHN MAURICE CLARK, THE CONTROL OF
TRUSTS (Rewritten and Enlarged, 1912)
193
Id, preface at vii.
194
Id. at 28.
195
JOHN MAURICE CLARK, OVERHEAD COSTS, supra note __ at 446.
196
Id. at 446.
191
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prices lower. So what appeared to be profitable entry before might not
be so later.197
The Clarks’ work developed the basic model that emerged by
mid-century for monopolization cases that prevails today. That judge
made formulation required a showing of both monopoly power and
anticompetitive practices. This model retained faith that in a market
that is not restrained by either the government or private action, new
entry could be expected to maintain competition. The problem for the
antitrust laws was anticompetitive practices that forestalled
competitive entry before it could occur or become effective. “A merely
possible mill which as yet does not exist may forestall and prevent
monopolistic acts,” the Clarks observed, provided that the way is
“quite open for it to appear.”198
Writing in 1911 about the ongoing government cases against
Standard Oil and American Tobacco, Robert Raymond observed that
the cases depended on the suppression of potential competition.199 In
American Tobacco the district court condemned a trust agreement that
involved a group of the same shareholders’ acquiring interests in
multiple companies. It acknowledged the defense that potential
competition would remain because the union itself did not involve any
sort of market exclusion.200 But entry would take some time, the court
observed, and the “objection is to present and not future conditions.”
He believed that argument to be worthy of “serious consideration.”201
By contrast, in the first United Shoe Machinery (USM) case the
Supreme Court refused to condemn the union of several shoe
machinery makers into what became the USM Company.202 The
government’s argument was that the merged companies were potential
competitors who could have turned into actual competitors but for the
merger. The case thus invited a tradeoff question that remains to this
197

Ibid. Cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and
Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 283 (1977) (adapting this model to illustrate
possibility of predatory pricing at above cost prices).
198
Clark and Clark, supra note __ at 121.
199
Robert L. Raymond, The Standard Oil and Tobacco Cases, 25 HARV. L.
REV. 31 (1911).
200
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 191 F.371 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
201
Id. at 389.
202
United Stats v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
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day: some mergers increase productive efficiency by enabling a firm
to do things at lower cost, but in the process may harm competition by
preventing competition that might have developed had the merger not
occurred. The USM union itself was a merger of complements, and the
district court had concluded that the individual companies were not in
competition with one another at the time of the union. 203 Justice
Holmes had actually elaborated on that conclusion several years earlier
in a decision that approved the original merger.204 He also observed
that the participating firms had not been competitors but rather were
makers of complements. It was not the purpose of the Sherman Act to
“reduc[e] all manufacture to isolated units of the lowest degree.” In
this case “the combination was simply an effort after greater
efficiency.”205 He compared the merger to a situation in which a single
firm was created to make “every part of a steam engine,” rather than
using the antitrust laws to force “one to make the boilers and another
to make the wheels.”206
In the American Can case, which condemned the can making
trust but declined to break it up, the court also cited potential
competition as the reason for being cautious about the remedy.207 The
court observed that the American Can company, given its large size
and multiple plants, was highly efficient and made good cans.208
Further, the record revealed “that there are many ways in which a large
and strong can maker can serve the trade, and a small one cannot.” In
any event, the defendant’s power to restrain competition was limited
by “a large volume of actual competition and to a still greater extent
by the potential competition” from which it cannot escape.209 For
example, when the defendant raised its price – perhaps prematurely
believing that it had destroyed sufficient rivals – new competitors
203

See Id. at 41-42.
United States v. Sidney W. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
205
Id. at 217.
206
Id. at 217-218.
207
United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 903 (D.Md. 1916).
208
Id. at 894:
Defendant makes good cans…. The impression produced by the
testimony is that it has been more uniformly successful in so doing
than perhaps any of its competitors, although the larger and more
responsible of these have, in recent years, habitually turned out
thoroughly satisfactory packers' cans.
209
Id. at 903.
204
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quickly re-emerged. It became “apparently profitable for outsiders to
start making cans with any antiquated or crude machinery they could
find in old lumber rooms….”210 At that point the defendant became so
desperate that it actually started buying cans from its rivals, even
though these were “very badly made.” Many of these were later
destroyed.211
The language of potential competition gradually evolved into
the modern doctrine of “barriers to entry.” An entry barrier could be
either natural or fabricated obstacles that made it more difficult for
competition to enter the market. The Supreme Court first used the term
in the American Tobacco case, when it referred to the defendant’s
acquiring control of numerous “seemingly independent corporations,
serving as perpetual barriers to the entry of others into the tobacco
trade.”212 More specifically, the court referred to the defendant’s
acquisition of plants “not for the purpose of utilizing them, but in order
to close them up and render them useless” and noncompetition clauses
placed on sellers that kept them from re-entering the market.213 A few
years later a district court quoted this language in condemning
Eastman Kodak of monopolization by acquiring around twenty
companies and from them assembling all of the components of the
photography industry.214 The term did not find much use in the
economic literature until the 1940s, followed by significant expansion
in the 1950s.215 It entered the mainstream antitrust literature after Joe
S. Bain’s pioneering work on barriers to entry in the 1950s.216

210

Id. at 879.
Id. at 880.
212
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 183 (1911).
213
Ibid.
214
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 F. 62, 75 (W.D.N.Y. 1915).
215
E.g., Ralph George Hawtrey, Competition from Newcomers, 10
ECONOMICA 219 (1943). See also Joe S. Bain’s first article on the subject.
Joe S. Bain, A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 39 AM. ECON.
REV. 448 (1949).
216
E.g., JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER
AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956).
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From Potential Competition to the Relevant Market

As long as confidence was high that potential competition could
be trusted to prevent monopoly prices, the precise definition of the
market in which firms operated was relatively unimportant. As that
confidence decreased it becomes more important to know the number
and robustness of a firm’s actual competitors. Discipline of monopoly
would have to come from them.
Concerns about potential competition are inherently dynamic.
They ask about where a market is going, rather than how it may appear
today. In fact, accounting for movement and the ability to make useful
predictions about it is one of the most challenging questions of antitrust
policy. Traditional economists assumed markets were competitive
unless the government intervened because they focused so completely
on the long run. The fact that monopoly might be dissipated by new
market entry is certainly reassuring. Eventually such a market may
reach an acceptably competitive equilibrium, but how long will that
take, and who will be affected along the way? Focusing on
macroeconomics in the 1920s, John Maynard Keynes famously
compared the optimistic faith of many economists that eventually the
economy would move to a healthier equilibrium with the policy
maker’s concern about time and short-run costs. He famously
concluded that the “long run is a misleading guide to current affairs.
In the long run we are all dead.”217 Further, focusing on the long run
makes economics worthless as a policy tool: “Economist set
themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they
can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat
again.”218
The “relevant market” in antitrust analysis emerged as a device for
trading off these static and dynamic concerns. It revealed who was
competing with whom in the present instant. If the market was well
defined and included consideration of entry barriers, it also estimated
what was likely to change over time. The fundamental concern was

217
218

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923).
Ibid.
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with how rivals and customers would respond to a future price increase
above competitive levels.
The idea of the “relevant market” is entirely a creature of partial
equilibrium analysis. While that proposition is uncontroversial, it was
not commonly acknowledged in the antitrust literature until Oliver
Williamson began talking about antitrust policy and welfare tradeoffs
in the 1960s.219 As Alfred Marshall had observed, in selecting a market
economists should group sales of close substitutes and then make a
working assumption that those within the grouping affect one
another’s behavior, but that firms outside of the group do not. Marshall
also realized that this was a simplifying assumption and not a hard
picture of a situation in which the elasticity of substitution between
goods in the same market is infinitely high, while the substitution
between goods inside and goods outside is zero.220 Today we
commonly say that to the extent a market is “well defined” these two
conditions come closer to applying.
Assessing antitrust practices by reference to the “market” in
which they occur naturally produced several questions about
delineation and measurement. The most obvious one was how to
identify the particular grouping of firms to which the analysis should
be applied. Alfred Marshall himself paid scant attention to the issue.
He identified the grouping of sales in a particular market as a
“commodity,” such as tea, his favorite choice of an example.221 In that
case, sales of tea constituted the relevant market. He gave only a little
thought to questions about whether tea competed with coffee or water,
219

Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: the Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). See also Oliver E. Williamson,
Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 699
(1977). On Williamson’s usage, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming
Crisis in Antitrust Economics, 101 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 489 (2021).
220
Cf. Williamson, Economies, supra note __ at 23:
Our partial equilibrium analysis suffers from a defect common to all
partial equilibrium constructions. By isolating one sector from the
rest of the economy it fails to examine interactions between sectors.
Certain economic effects may therefore go undetected, and
occasionally behavior which appears to yield net economic benefits
in a partial equilibrium analysis will result in net losses when
investigated in a general equilibrium context.
221
E.g., MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES (1890), supra note __ at 154, 159.
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or even the extent to which a coffee producer might switch to tea in
response to a higher price. He did conjecture at one point that a failure
in the coffee harvest might lead to an increase in demand for tea.222 He
also noted that questions about “where the lines of division between
different commodities can be drawn must be settled by the
convenience of the particular question under discussion.”223 For some
purposes, he acknowledged, we might even acknowledge Chinese and
Indian teas as different.224
Early Sherman Act cases took roughly the same approach,
never putting a fine point on market definition. For example, neither
the 1911 Standard Oil225 nor American Tobacco226 decisions discussed
the boundaries of the “market” under consideration. In American
Tobacco the Court did observe that the defendant produced a number
of products, including “cheroots, smoking tobacco, fine cut tobacco,
snuff and plug tobacco.”227 The Court did discuss some vertical
practices that involved different products. For example, the defendant
also tried to control sales of licorice paste, an essential ingredient in
plug tobacco, in order to exclude rivals.228 The American Can decision
a few years later described a large litany of bad practices but said
virtually nothing about the scope of the market, other than to refer to
it as “cans.”229 It gave no thought to such questions as whether glass
222

Id. at 160 (describing coffee as something that could be used as a substitute
for tea). See also 168 n. 2, noting that the price of substitutes might change,
thus affecting the demand for the primary good. He gave as an example a
fall in the price of beef, which could cause it to be used in place of mutton.
223
Id., 160 n. 2.
224
Ibid.
225
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)
226
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (noting that
the complaint referred to “tobacco and the products of tobacco”; no further
analysis of market boundaries).
227
Id., 221 U.S. at 159. A cheroot is an inexpensive, untapered cigar.
228
Id. at 170. In United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 56-57 (1920), the
Supreme Court did address rather one railroad line eliminated competition
when it acquired a contiguous line, and held that the lines were not
competing. See also United States v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 203 F. 295
(S.D.Ohio 1912) (similar; some lines competed but others did not).
229
United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859 (D. Md. 1916). See also
United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (dismissing complaint
with no discussion of relevant market); United States v. International
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bottles, which were also widely used for preserving food, were in the
same market. Such questions arose regularly after mid-century.230

Harvester Co., 214 F. 987, 991 (D. Minn. 1914), app. dism’d, 248 U.S. 587
(1918), which condemned a voting trust of several companies that formed
the defendant. The product was identified as “harvesting machinery,” of
which the defendant controlled 85%, but with no dispute or discussion about
market boundaries. The court did observe that IH was a New Jersey
corporation and that its charter stated that it was formed to
Manufacture, sell, and deal in harvesting machines, tools, and
implements of all kinds, including harvesters, binders, reapers,
mowers, rakes, headers, shedders, machinery, engines, wagons,
motor vehicles, and vehicles of all kinds; agricultural machinery,
tools, and implements of all kinds, binder twine, and all devices,
materials, and articles used or intended for use in connection
therewith, and all repair parts and other devices, materials, and
articles used, or intended for use, in connection with any kind of
harvesting or agricultural machines, tools, or implements, or any
gasoline, electric, or other vehicles.
See also United States v. Corn Refining Co., 234 F. 964, 974 (S.D.N.Y.
1916), app. dism’d, 249 U.S. 621 (1919) (condemning a trust, but in the
process noting that the relevant process including wet milling and dry milling
of corn; the court observed that cost distinctions among them were relevant:
If the wet process is cheaper than the dry, then, although a monopoly
of the wet will be limited by the dry, it is improper to consider the
production of the dry millers, when ascertaining the proportion of
production controlled by a supposed monopolist of wet milling. If,
on the other hand, the dry process is cheaper than the wet, and if,
which would be hardly possible, a sustained competition between
them existed, then one could not disregard the dry production for all
purposes.
Accord O’Halloran v. American Sea Green Slate Co., 207 F. 187, 193
(N.D.N.Y. 1913), rev’d on other grounds, 229 F. 77 (2d Cir. 1915) (where
black and green slate competed for some buyers but the green slate
manufacturers had both production and cost disadvantages, their power was
limited by the price of black slate). Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
283 U.S. 163 (1931) (although gasoline made by traditional refining methods
and the defendant’s large scale “cracking” method was fungible, the latter
had an advantage in production costs).
230
Cf. United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) (combining metal
cans and glass bottles into the same relevant market for antitrust analysis).
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The International Shoe case, decided in 1930, included a brief
discussion of the proper delineation of a product market. It also
reflected the emergence of product differentiation as a factor in market
analysis. The FTC challenged a merger of two manufacturers of dress
shoes. McElwain made more expensive, attractive, and “modern”
shoes entirely of leather. International made cheaper shoes that
included some non-leather components.231 Without discussing the
scope of the market, the Court did credit the defendants’ testimony that
there was “no real competition” between the two firms.232
Estimating market power today by reference to a share of a
“relevant market” is not a pure exercise in static partial equilibrium
analysis. In Marshall’s model, one examined equilibrium in the market
under study on the assumption that the price and output of everything
else remained constant. “For instance,” he wrote, “the demand
schedule for tea is drawn out on the assumption that the price of coffee
is known.”233 However, he also acknowledged that this assumption
often fails to obtain in the real world:
The demand schedule represents the changes in the price at
which a commodity can be sold … other things being equal.
But in fact other things seldom are equal over periods of time
sufficiently long for the collection of full and trustworthy
statistics…. This difficult is aggravated by the fact that in
economics the full effects of a cause seldom come out at once
but often spread themselves out….”234
A price increase naturally invites other sellers to move into the
price increaser’s market territory, and customers to defect away. The
increase upsets the equilibrium, and within Marshall’s model these
231

International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
Id. at 299. Cf. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344
(1933) (defendants controlled 74.4% of coal production in their area but only
12% of production east of Mississippi River, and nearly none of the
purchasers were in the smaller area); Indiana Farmer’s Guide Pub. Co. v.
Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934) (reversing and remanding after
noting dispute about whether the area of effective competition for the
defendants’ farm publications was limited to the territory in which they
operated or should include the entire country).
233
MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES (1890) supra note __ at 160.
234
Id. at 170.
232
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movements occur until the equilibrium is restored. To the extent the
market is more rigorously defined and the market share of the price
increaser is higher, the movements would take longer or be less likely
to occur.235
The 1940s and 1950s saw a significant expansion in antitrust
usage of relevant markets to estimate market power. Judge Hand’s
discussion in the Second Circuit’s 1945 decision in United States v.
Alcoa has become famous.236 The first Supreme Court decision to
contain a significant discussion about the scope of a relevant market
was United States v. Columbia Steel in 1948.237 It concluded that the
market as the government alleged it was too narrow.238 First, the area
of effective competition was larger than the government claimed.
Second, the two firms actually made different although somewhat
overlapping types of steel. On a 5-4 vote, it dismissed the complaint.
Justice Douglas’ dissent (joined by Justices Black, Murphy, and
Rutledge) is interesting because it contained almost no discussion of
the relevant market issues except to dispute the fact that the acquired
firm’s 3% share of the purchasing market under consideration was
insubstantial.239
The chronology of these concerns is revealing because of what
it says about the declining faith in potential competition to solve
monopoly problems. As noted previously, for some participants in the
Chicago Trust Conference even monopoly was not a matter of concern
because potential competition could be trusted to keep prices down.240
Subsequently, greater doubts about the disciplinary effects of new
entry naturally led to increased concerns about just how competitive
the market was when entry is disregarded. By the 1930s most antitrust
cases involving large firms were harboring significant doubts about the

235

See Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34
(1937).
236
E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945). See also United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co
(Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (cellophane).
237
334 U.S. 495, 495 (1948).
238
Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. at 510-522.
239
Id. at 538 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
240
See discussion supra, text at notes __.
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ameliorating effects of potential competition. That explains the rising
importance of market definition in antitrust cases.
PROGRESSIVE ANTITRUST POLICY AND VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Progressive antitrust policy makers developed a view of
vertical business integration and contract practices that has proven to
be very durable in antitrust. This was no small accomplishment,
because vertical business practices have historically been the most
poorly understood in antitrust and have provoked the most
controversy. Articulate writers have argued that they should be
governed by both the extreme rules of per se illegality and per se
legality.241
Shortly after the Progressive period the antitrust law of vertical
business relationships veered to the left and became very aggressive.
Then in the 1970s it changed course, veering very far to the right and
developing rules of virtual nonliability in academic writing, although
the case law never went quite that far.242 Today it is moderating. The
rule of reason that is currently the law is somewhere in between,
although somewhat closer to a rule of nonliability. This is at least
partly a consequence of the fact that we have made it much too difficult
for plaintiffs to win antitrust cases under rule of reason.
The thoroughly conventional distinction that antitrust makes
today between “horizontal” and “vertical” practices is actually a
creature of the twentieth century. Today most of our rules of illegality
depend on it: horizontal restraints are more suspicious than vertical
ones; unlike vertical arrangements, horizontal arrangements increase
the effective market share of the participants; horizontal price fixing is
more threatening than vertical price fixing; vertical arrangements have
a greater potential to produce cost savings; horizontal mergers get
closer scrutiny than vertical ones. The list goes on.

241

See Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a
Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487 (1983) (per se
illegal); Richard A Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se legality, 48 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 6 (1981) (per
se legal).
242
E.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 280-309 (1978).
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This distinction has not always obtained. The classical political
economists tended to see competition as “rivalry,” and the vertical
rivalry that might occur between a buyer and a seller, or employer and
employee, counted just as much as the rivalry between two
competitors. For example, in the 1888 edition of his text on political
economy, MIT economist Francis Walker defined competition as “the
operation of individual self-interest among buyers and sellers.”243
Alfred Marshall did only a little better in Principles of
Economics. In his discussion of labor he distinguished horizontal
movement of workers from one firm to another from vertical
movement, or promotion within a firm.244 Speaking again of labor, he
also discussed the “vertical” competition that existed between skilled
and unskilled workers who performed the same task.245 On horizontal
dominance, he focused almost entirely on single firms that accounted
for all sales in a market. In a footnote he spoke briefly about “partial
monopoly,” which he described as a firm whose wares were better
known than those of other firms.246 His chapter on “The Theory of
Monopolies” largely assumed exclusivity and was focused on how the
monopolist determines its output and price.247 He did mention that a
vulnerable monopolist, such as a railroad threatened by new
competition, would very likely charge a lower price in order to protect
its trade.248 Never once in the 750 pages of the first edition of
Principles did Marshall mention cartels or price fixing.249
Even Justice Holmes, who knew economics better than most
contemporary judges, spoke of competition in both vertical and
horizontal terms. While a Justice on the Supreme Judicial Court of
243

FRANCIS WALKER, POLITICAL ECONOMY 263 (3d ed. 1888).
MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES (1890), supra note __, at 277.
245
Id. at 705.
246
Id. at 112 n. 1.
247
Id., Chapter 8, pp. 456 et seq.
248
Id. at 465.
249
In his Eighth Edition, published in 1920, Marshall did acknowledge the
rise of “trading federations,” including “German cartels and centralized
cooperative associations,” and blamed these for rising industrial
concentration. See MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES (8th ed. 1920), supra note __ at
282. He also commented on the rise of the “trust” in the United States as an
alternative to German cartels. Id. at 304. He concluded that the formation
of cartels was “treacherous,” id. at 495
244
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Massachusetts, he had defined competition in a tort case as “not
limited to struggles between persons of the same class” but rather as
applying “to all conflicts of temporal interests.”250 He continued,
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that
between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his
services, and that of society, disguised under the name of
capital, to get his services for the least possible return.251
In keeping with more modern views, in 1908 the Supreme Court of
Illinois rejected that characterization, describing it as “fanciful and farfetched.” It then concluded that an employer and its unionized
employees could not be said to be in “competition” with one another,
even though their interests clearly diverged.252
Holmes also dissented from the United States Supreme Court’s
decision condemning resale price maintenance. The Court had
reasoned that resale price maintenance served to eliminate competition
among dealers in the sale of Dr. Miles brand of medicines.253 Holmes
responded that the competition of “conflicting desires” should be
sufficient to do that for most goods that were not essential, and Dr.
Miles medicines were not.254 If a good was not essential (Holmes gave
the example of “short rations in a shipwreck”) the price would be set
by the “competition” between the seller’s wish to charge more and the
buyer’s wish to pay as little as possible.255 In the Northern Securities
merger case he dissented from the majority’s condemnation of a
merger to monopoly under §1 of the Sherman Act.256 The “act says
nothing about competition,” he observed. He then described the litany
250

Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 107, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896)
(Holmes, j., dissenting) Holmes also developed this view in Oliver W.
Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1(1894).
251
Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081.
252
Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 15, 232 Ill. 424, 432-432
(1908).
253
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-408
(1911) (describing the resale price maintenance agreement at issue as
“designed to maintain prices after the complainant has parted with the title to
the articles, and to prevent competition among those who trade in them.”).
254
Id.at 412.
255
Id. at 412.
256
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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of common law situations characterized as contracts in restraint of
trade and concluded that the facts of the present case did not fit into
any of them.257 The idea that elimination of competition might result
in higher prices did not obviously trouble him.
With one implicit exception, the Sherman Act itself never
distinguishes vertical from horizontal practices. The exception is the
reference to “contracts … in restraint of trade” in §1 of the Act.258 As
Holmes pointed out in his Northern Securities dissent, at common law
that phrase referred to “contracts with a stranger to the contractor’s
business … which wholly or partially restrict the freedom of the
contractor in carrying on that business as otherwise he would.”259
Holmes gave as an example the British decision in Mitchel v.
Reynolds.260 The lessor of a building to be used by the plaintiff as a
bakery promised not to open a competing bakery in the vicinity.
Noncompetition agreements such as this are vertical because they are
formally between the seller (lessor) and buyer (lessee) of property, or
in other situations between an employer and an employee.
Nevertheless, the agreement also has a horizontal component to the
extent that its purpose is to limit the competitive choices of the
promisor. In Mitchel, the lessor had promised the lessee that he would
not enter into business in competition with the lessee.
At the time the Sherman Act was passed the idea of a distinct
set of vertical practices was almost entirely absent, and the term was
even largely foreign to economics. The nearly 700 pages of
proceedings of the Chicago conference on trusts never discusses
vertical integration or vertical practices. Alfred Marshall did not use
the term to describe vertical distribution practices, although he did use
“vertical’ to speak about the upward as opposed to lateral mobility of
labor.261 Federal antitrust case law did not use the term “vertical” to
refer to challenged practices until the 1930s. A district court opinion
in 1934 in the Sugar Institute case spoke about the possibility that

257

Id. at 403-404.
15 U.S.C. §1.
259
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403-404 (1904)
(Holmes, j., dissenting).
260
1 PWms 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (QB, 1711).
258

261

MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES, supra note __ at 277, 705.
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“vertical organization of distribution agencies” might result in “a lower
price to the ultimate consumers.”262
Explicit case law recognition of a distinction between
horizontal and vertical distribution practices took hold in the 1930s,
and in an unlikely way. After the Dr. Miles decision holding resale
price maintenance (RPM) unlawful, interest groups dominated by
small business began a “fair trade” campaign to permit individual
states to opt out and permit RPM in their borders.263 After some state
attempts to do so unilaterally, Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Act
in 1937. The statute gave states the authority to legalize RPM within
their borders, but it invited considerable dispute about its scope. That
statute itself never used the terms “vertical” nor “horizontal.” It also
contained a proviso that it did not immunize agreements among
manufacturers, producers, and wholesalers.264 Nevertheless, the scope
of its immunity had to be determined judicially. Because the proviso
was triggered by state legislation, it was interpreted mainly by state
courts, who very largely concluded that the statute exempted “vertical”
262

United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
On the Fair Trade movement, see LAWYER PHILLIPS SAWYER, AMERICAN
FAIR TRADE: PROPRIETARY CAPITALISM, CORPORATISM, AND THE “NEW
COMPETITION,” 1890-1940 at 303-304 (2018).
264
The Act provided that §1 of the Sherman Act should not
render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices
for the re-sale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container
of which bears, the trademark, brand, or name of the producer or
distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open
competition with commodities of the same general class produced or
distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of that
description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under any
statute, law or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State
..in which such resale is to be made or to which the commodity is to
be transported for such resale ....
However, then the statute provided further:
That the preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or
agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance of
minimum resale prices on any commodity herein involved, between
manufacturers, or between producers, or between wholesalers, or
between brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, or between
persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other.
Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, 250 Stat. 693 (1937), repealed by Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801.
263
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agreements but not “horizontal” ones. For example, the North Carolina
Supreme Court explained:
The agreements authorized by the law are vertical, between
manufacturers or producers of the particular branded
commodity and those handling the product in a straight line
down to and including the retailer; not horizontal, as between
producers and wholesalers or persons and concerns in
competition with each other.265
The Supreme Court eventually confirmed this view as a matter of
federal antitrust law in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp,266 concluding that “the statute did “not authorize horizontal
contracts, that is to say, contracts or agreements between
manufacturers, between producers….”267
In distinguishing vertical from horizontal practices, the
difficult part was to determine how a firm’s control of a vertically
related market affected competition. Economists of the day were
keenly aware that vertical integration could reduce costs,268 as were
the courts. Already in 1866, a British decision observed that one effect
265

Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528, 535 (1939). See
also Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 363 Ill. 610,
614 (1936):
Contracts between plaintiff and wholesale distributors, or between
distributors and retailers, are denominated vertical price-fixing
contracts. Such contracts are permitted by the statute. Contracts
between producers or between wholesalers or between retailers as to
sale or resale prices are denominated horizontal price-fixing
contracts and are not within the terms of the statute because of their
character as combinations in restraint of trade.
See also Port Chester Wine & Liquor Shop v. Miller Bros Fruiterers, 1 N.Y.S.
802, 808 (N. Y. S. Ct. 1938) (explicitly distinguishing horizontal and vertical
agreements); Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 561-562 (1936)
(same).
266

341 U.S. 384 (1951).

267

Id. at 410. See Comment, Resale Price Maintenance by an Integrated
Firm: the McKesson & Robbins Case, 24 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1957)
268
E.g., William F. Willoughby, The Integration of Industry in the United
States, 16 Q. J. ECON. 94, 108 (1902)
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of a railroad’s acquisition of a colliery was to reduce the cost of coal
necessary for its operations.269 They were also aware of foreclosure
threats but did not generally find them decisive. In 1886 the Supreme
Court held that a railroad that had integrated vertically into express
freight delivery services had no obligation to provide equivalent
services for an independent delivery company.270 Justices Miller and
Field dissented, observing that the effect would be to exclude
competing express companies from the market. There was no relevant
antitrust law, but they would have found a duty under the law of
common carriers.271 A few years later Justice Harlan wrote an opinion
for the Court declaring that an exclusive dealing contract between a
railroad and a provider of sleeping cars was not contrary to public
policy.272
Speaking of noncompetition covenants, which are a form of
vertical exclusive contracting, Judge Taft’s 1898 opinion in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co,273 noted that they could
sometimes be harmful. They might injure the parties by depriving them
of opportunities; or they might deprive the public of services that
would be valuable and thus discourage enterprise. In addition, he gave
two reasons more directly related to competition policy: they might
“prevent competition and enhance prices,” and they “expose the public
to all the evils of monopoly.”274 For its part, the common law approved
the great majority of vertical agreements with the exception of some
noncompetition contracts.275
That analysis still left many questions open. For example, how
does one account for the fact that vertical arrangements may
simultaneously reduce costs and exclude rivals? Further, how much
weight should be given to the common law’s traditional strong
protection for liberty of contract and the freedom to trade? Those
concerns loomed large in cases involving resale price maintenance and
269

Lyde v. Eastern Bengal Ry., 55 Eng. Rep. 1059, 1062 (1866).
Memphis & L.R.R. Co. v. Southern Exp. C0., 117 U.S. 1 (1886).
271
Id. at 29, 33.
272
Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans R.R. v. Pullman S. Car Co., 139 U.S.
79, 89-90 (1891)
273
85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
274
Id. at 280, quoting Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. 51, 54, 36 Mass. 51 (1837).
275
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of
Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 156-158 (1988).
270
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other vertical restraints, where the freedom to trade came to be the
freedom to be free from restrictions on distribution.276 As the Supreme
Court reiterated in a 1919 decision declining to find an agreement to
engage in resale price maintenance, the purpose of the Sherman Act is
to “preserve the right of freedom to trade.”277
Historically the common law did recognize limitations on
business firms’ vertical integration by contract, but the concerns did
not arise in the first instance under competition law. First was the
common law policy against restraints on alienation, which the courts
frequently cited as a rational for condemning vertical contractual
limitations on resale.278 The Supreme Court cited this concern as
recently as 1967, when it declared territorial restraints on dealers to be
per se antitrust violations.279
Second, by their nature many of these contracts were
incomplete because they did not specify price or quantity. The
common law itself exhibited a strong preference for “one off”
contracts that contemplated sales with precise terms covering all of the
important elements. Here, the most frequently challenged practice was
requirements contracts, which later came to be called exclusive
dealing. Such contracts were routinely struck down, not because of
concerns for competition, but because contracts specifying all of a
purchaser’s needs, as opposed to a specific number of units, lacked
specificity. Samuel Williston approved of that restrictive interpretation
in his highly influential 1920 treatise on contracts, concluding that a
276

See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 403
(1988) (condemning resale price maintenance agreement: citing the “public
interest in maintaining freedom of trade with respect to future sales after the
article has been laced on the market and the producers has parted with his
title.”).
277
United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
278
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 403-404
(1911) (“The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of
general property in moveables…,” citing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY,
RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY §§27, 28 (1895), and 2 SIR
EDWARD COKE, COKE UPON LITTLETON §360 (1628)).
279
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377-378 (1967)
(agreeing with government that territorial restraints are “restraints upon
alienation which are beyond the power of the manufacturer to impose upon
its vendees”).
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promise to sell all of a purchaser’s needs without precise specification
of the number is “not sufficient consideration” to make an enforceable
contract.280 This rule threatened the early development of business
franchising, because franchise agreements were by nature open ended
as to price, quantities and other terms of dealing.281
Another concern that the case law reflected and that did breach
the boundary into antitrust policy was when contractual restraints were
included in patent licenses. Initially the courts refused to enforce such
agreements under patent law under a variety of doctrines intended to
limit the power of patentees to impose restrictions on patented articles
once they had been sold.282 For example, in the famous case of Wilson
v. Simpson, forty years prior to the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court
held that a patentee could not require purchasers of its wood planing
machine to purchase its own disposable blades.283 In Adams v. Burke
(1873) the Supreme Court refused to enforce a condition imposed by
the manufacturer/patentee of coffin lids limiting the geographic area
where the lids could be used for a burial.284 In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus,285 it refused to enforce a resale price maintenance agreement
contained in a book copyright license, three years before the Supreme
Court applied the antitrust laws in the Dr. Miles decision. In sum,
beginning long prior to the application of antitrust law the Supreme
Court was routinely denying enforcement to vertical restrictions
contained in patent or copyright licenses.
The IP cases generated considerable pushback from judges, on
competition grounds. One example was Judge (later Justice) Horace
280

SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §104 (1920) (citing
numerous decisions). See, e.g., Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter Cooper’s
Glue Factory, 132 N.E. 148, 149 (N.Y. 1921) (contract that did not specify
quantity void). Other developments are analyzed in Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-1960, 95 IOWA
L. REV. 863 (2010).
281
E.g, Huggman v. Paige-Detroit Motor Car Co., 262 F. 116 (8th Cir. 1919)
(automobile franchise agreement invalid for indefiniteness).
See
Hovenkamp, Law of Vertical Integration, supra note __ at 892-900.
282
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Design of Production 103
CORN. L. REV. 1155 (2018).
283
Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. 109 (1850).
284
Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 460 (1873).
285
210 U.S. 339, 349-351 (1908).
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Lurton’s 1896 opinion in Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v.
Eureka Specialty Co.286 The seller of a patented button-fastening
machine prohibited purchasers of the machine from using it with any
except its own unpatented fasteners, one of which connected each
button to a garment. In modern terms we would characterize this
arrangement as a variable proportion tying arrangement.287 In addition
to a dispute over the reasonable scope of the patent license in which
the restriction was placed, the purchaser made an argument “based
upon principles of public policy in respect of monopolies and contracts
in restraint of trade.”288 The gist was that “public policy forbids a
patentee from so contracting with reference to his monopoly as to
create another monopoly in an unpatented article”289 Judge Lurton
responded by noting that the tying clause served the useful purpose of
measuring usage of the machine in order to determine the royalty.290
In 1912 a divided Supreme Court relied heavily on the button
fastener case to hold in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. that the maker of a
patented office copying machine could tie its own unpatented paper,
stencils, and ink to the machine.291 The Sherman Act had now been
passed, but the Court rejected the contention that it prohibited this kind
of agreement. Rather, the Court noted the general rule of “absolute
freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws.”292
The Henry decision proved to be too much. Congress
responded two years later with §3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibited
ties of goods “whether patented or unpatented,” provided that harm to
competition was shown.293 With that statement, the law of tying
migrated from patent law into antitrust law. The statute actually went
further, prohibiting not only absolute ties but also discounts or rebates

286

77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §10.6e (6th ed. 2020).
288
Id. at 292.
289
Ibid.
290
Id. at 296 (“The fasteners are thus made the counters by which the royalty
proportioned to the actual use of the machine is determined.”).
291
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912). By this time Judge Lurton had
been elevated to the Supreme Court and wrote the opinion.
292
Id. at 29-30.
293
15 U.S.C. §14.
287
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conditioned on tying.294 However, it did not condemn all ties or even
all patent ties, but only those that threatened to “substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.” Indeed, it is hardly clear
that the Clayton Act would have condemned the button and office
copier ties that provoked Congress to act. Both were of common
commodities and very likely caused no harm to competition.
In 1917 the Supreme Court overruled Henry in condemning a
tying arrangement involving the Edison motion picture projector. It
was sold subject to a patent license agreement that prohibited users
from showing any films other than the seller’s own.295 By the time of
the litigation separate patents on the film had expired, and the Court
read the notice as effectively attempting to continue the film patent’s
exclusivity by tying the film to the patent projector.296 While the
decision generally relied on patent law, the Court quoted the new
Clayton Act provision as confirming its conclusion.297 Unlike Henry,
the Motion Picture Patents case did very likely involve a serious threat
of monopoly in the infant motion picture industry.298 After 1930 the
tying decisions were not so circumspect.299
Resale price maintenance – a so-called intrabrand restraint
because it does not limit competition with rival products – received
harsher treatment. Today we are inclined to think that tying
arrangements present greater potential for competitive harm than do
resale price maintenance agreements. In 1907 Judge Lurton, still on
the Sixth Circuit held that an agreement between a proprietary
medicine manufacturer and its various distributors and resellers
stipulating their resale price was not enforceable as a contract in

Ibid. (“discount from, or rebate upon”).
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917).
294
295

296

Id. at 518.

297

Id. at 517.
See Alexandra Gil, Breaking the Studios: Antitrust and the Motion Picture
Industry, 3 NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 83, 92-93 (2008).
299
E.g., Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27
(1931). See discussion infra, text at notes __.
298
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restraint of trade.300 There were no antitrust issues.301 The difference
between this case and his own previous decision in the ButtonFastener case, the court held, was that the medicines in question may
have been protected by a trade secret, but they were not patented.302
Four years later the Supreme Court agreed in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co.303 It referenced the Sherman Act only to
conclude that earlier decisions refusing to apply it had all involved
patented products.304
By 1930 the law of vertical practices had developed to a place
not all that different from where it is today, save for the differential
treatment of resale price maintenance. Tying arrangements were
addressable under antitrust, but liability was very largely limited to
firms that had dominant market shares, or where foreclosure
percentages were high. For example, in addition to Motion Picture
Patents the IBM tying case of 1936 found a tie of IBM’s computation
machine and its data cards to be unlawful, but only on a market share
that exceeded 80%.305 By contrast, GM’s tie of car repairs to its
original equipment parts was approved when the court concluded that
the tie was essential for quality control and that there was plenty of
competition in any event.306 The same thing was true of exclusive
dealing, which condemned the practice when it realistically threatened
to perpetuate market dominance. In a decision applying the Clayton
300

John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907).

301

Judge Lurton did note that a case involving a horizontal agreement to engage in
resale price maintenance had proceeded under the antitrust laws. Id. at 35,
discussing Jayne v. Loder, 149 F. 21 (3d Cir. 1906).
302

Id. at 27-28.
220 U.S. 373 (1911). Justice Lurton was already on the Supreme Court
but did not participate.
304
220 U.S. at 400, referring to E. Bement & Sons v. Nat. Harrow Co., 186
U.S. 70 (1902) (price fixing agreement contained in patent license
enforceable)
305
IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 136 (1936) (IBM made 81% of
the tabulating cards while its only rival, Remington-Rand, made 19%).
306
Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors corp., 80 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 1935)
aff’d per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936). See also United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Co., 264 F. 138, 167 (E.D. Mo. 1920) aff’d 258 U.S. 451 (1921)
(noting delicate nature of tied repair parts); FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261
U.S. 463, 475 (1923) (refusing to condemn gasoline franchisor’s tie of its
own gasoline; noting that the market was competitive)
303
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Act to exclusive dealing the Court noted that the supplier controlled
roughly 40% of the dress pattern outlets in the country and that the
exclusive agreement in question threatened to create several local
monopolies.307 There was no antitrust law of vertical nonprice
restraints until the Supreme Court addressed the issue in White Motor
Co. v. United States, where Justice Douglas held for the Court that it
was too early to say.308 Resale price maintenance, which was unlawful
per se, was the outlier.
The law of vertical mergers and ownership vertical integration
cut a roughly similar path. The courts condemned it when it threatened
to create or preserve monopoly, but most generally only in
circumstances that involved substantial evidence of market dominance
or foreclosure. For example, judicial condemnation of vertical
integration in the American Tobacco,309 Corn Products,310 Kodak311,
and Keystone Watch decisions were all predicated on dominant market
shares.312 On the other hand, the court refused to condemn United
States Steel’s integration into distribution facilities,313 finding that the
integration improved efficiency and reduced costs and uncertainty.314
In affirming, the Supreme Court cited evidence that it was cheaper for
the defendant to combine several operations in a single facility, and

307

Standard Fashion v. Margrane-Houston, 258 U.S. 346, 362-363 (1922).
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
309
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). See also
United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 874 (D. Md. 1916), appeal
dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921) (condemning a pot pouri of vertical practices
by a dominant firm).
308

310

United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)
(acquisition of candy companies and then sold candy below cost; price
squeeze on syrup – both efforts unsuccessful but condemned as attempt to
monopolize)
311
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927)
312

United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 F. 502 (E.D.Pa. 1915)
(condemning combination of watch case and watch movement manufacturers).
313

United States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 103-108 (D.N.J.
1915), aff’d, 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (not unlawful to develop its own
warehouses, freight lines and shipping facilities if these were responsive to
ordinary needs of trade).
314

Id. at 124-125, 134.
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that this combination would enable it to compete more effectively in
the world market.315
In its unanimous decision in Eastern States Retail Lumber
Dealers Assn. v. United States, the Court even intervened to protect
ownership vertical integration in the lumber industry.316 The
defendants were classic examples of Progressive Era small businesses
who organized in order to protect themselves from larger vertically
integrated firms under the mantle of “fair trade.” In this case they
organized a boycott, agreeing among themselves that they would not
purchase lumber at wholesale from anyone who had vertically
integrated into retailing.
The law of vertical relationships began to go off the rails in the
1940s and after. The reasons are a confluence of factors. One of course
was the Great Depression and the dramatic rise of small business as an
interest group. Another was Roosevelt’s appointment of Thurman
Arnold to be head of the antitrust division, turning the Antitrust
Division into a potent anti-patent tool. The development of influential
models of imperfect competition may also have had some influence.317
In its International Salt tying decision in 1947 the Supreme
Court applied both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act to condemn
a non-foreclosing tie involving a common staple – salt – that was not
realistically capable of being monopolized.318 The case effectively
migrated patent act tying policy into antitrust law by holding that the
defendant’s patents on its salt injecting machine created a presumption
of market power sufficient to condemn that tie. It also watered down
the Clayton Act requirement that an unlawful tie may “substantially
lessen competition”319 by holding that proof of competitive harm did
not require foreclosure – something that would have been impossible
to show given that the tied product was ordinary salt.320 Rather it was
simply enough to show that the tying contracts covered a significant
315

251 U.S. at 443-444.

Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n. v United States, 234 U.S.
600, 611 (1914) (noting that those who refused to participate were branded
as “unfair dealers”).
317
See discussion infra, text at notes __.
318
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
319
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amount of salt. In this case that was approximately $500,000 per
year.321
From that point tying law was used aggressively to condemn
competitively harmless practices that the Court did not understand.
Nor did it need too, because the per se rule for tying that the court
adopted a few years later created a strong presumption of illegality
without structural analysis.322 The Court relied on Justice Frankfurter’s
dicta in the Standard Stations exclusive dealing case that “[t]ying
agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition.”323
In the Standard Stations decision in 1949 the Supreme Court
expanded the rules against exclusive dealing to prohibit Standard of
California from engaging in single-branding, or insisting that its
franchised gasoline stations pump only its own gasoline.324 The record
indicated that Standard’s contracts covered 6.7% of the gasoline sold
in California.325 The Court’s condemnation of the practice was too
much for Justice Douglas, otherwise an aggressive antitrust enforcer,
who predicted in his dissent that forcing franchised gasoline stations
to sell multiple brands of gasoline would force the refiners to build
their own stations, thus eliminating the smaller dealers altogether.326
One effect of these decisions was a long-standing hostility
toward tying arrangements that never extended to exclusive dealing.327
That distinction does not make a great deal of sense. While a tie
requires a dealer to carry a specific second product as a condition of
obtaining the first, exclusive dealing excludes a particular product
from the dealer’s entire business. For example, under tying a dealer

321

See id at 395.
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
323
Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 305306 (1949).
324
Ibid.
325
Id. at 295.
326
Id. at 315-318.
327
See, e.g., Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961)
(applying rule of reason in exclusive dealing case and dismissing complaint
for inadequate showing of foreclosure).
322
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that sells GM cars might be required to repair them using GM parts.328
By contrast, under exclusive dealing the dealer would be prohibited
from selling non-GM cars altogether. While outcomes vary with facts,
often the amount of market exclusion produced by exclusive dealing
exceeds the amount produced by thing.
The courts also became more aggressive about vertical
integration by merger and even by new entry.329 In fact, vertical
integration almost became a suspect category. After the merger law
was amended in 1950 so as to reach vertical as well as horizontal
mergers the Court applied it liberally to situations where foreclosures
were not in the 70%-100% range that Progressive Era and New Deal
courts had condemned, but sometimes as low as 3% or 4% on the
Supreme Court,330 or barely over 1% in the lower courts.331 Internal
vertical expansion earned similar treatment. For example, some
decisions condemned automobile makers’ decisions to distribute cars
through wholly owned dealerships rather than contracting with
independents.332 Numerous decisions in the 1960s and 1970s
prohibited nondominant firms for doing no more than switching to
self-distribution rather than relying on independent dealers.333 None of
these decisions has survived today.
328
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CONCLUSION

In 1932, two disruptive books appeared that presented the
theories of imperfect and monopolistic competition. One was written
by Cambridge University’s Joan Robinson,334 and the other by Edward
Chamberlin from Harvard.335 Both books reflected the Progressives’
increased skepticism about the benign qualities of markets. In the
process they also paved the way for significantly more aggressive
enforcement.
The theories of imperfect and monopolistic competition
immediately became influential in academic circles. They gradually
evolved into a single set of theories that today go by the name of
imperfect competition.336 Whether incidentally or as a result, antitrust
policy began to veer left and often went past all reasonable boundaries,
condemning efficient practices where the creation of monopoly was
virtually impossible.
This increased level of antitrust enforcement subsequently
provoked a fierce neoliberal reaction, mainly from the Chicago School
and prominently represented in the writing of George J. Stigler and, a
little later, Robert Bork.337 The Chicago School fought an ultimately
losing battle to present imperfect competition models as untestable or
incoherent. An empirical renaissance in economics, mainly in the
1970s and after, refuted that critique.338 Today imperfect models
clearly dominate the economic industrial organization literature as
many areas of antitrust law, and their empirical robustness is well
established.339
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The most general result has been a shift back toward the center.
Today antitrust policy sits between the decaying remnants of the final
years of the Roosevelt Court and the now defunct Chicago School
revolution. Against all of this the Progressive response – aggressive in
its own time but quite moderate today – has proven to be surprisingly
durable.
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